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Beyond Public/Private: Understanding Excessive
Corporate Prerogative
john a. powell and Stephen Menendian'
INTRODUCTION
n a televised Republican presidential debate in June, 2011, CNN anchor
John King presented a series of questions to the candidates concerning
the role of government, especially the federal government.2 In particular,
he probed the candidates' views on the role of the federal government
with respect to food safety, the foreclosure crisis, the housing market, space
exploration, and disaster relief.3 In the wake of unusually severe natural
disasters, flooding, tornadoes, and storms that swept across the plains states,
upper South, and Mississippi valley in the first half of 2011, the CNN
anchor asked former governor and businessman, Mitt Romney, whether
the states should play a larger role in disaster relief. 4 Candidate Romney
replied, "[elvery time you have an occasion to take something from the
federal government and send it back to the states, that's the right direction.
And if you can go even further and send it back to the private sector, that's
even better."5
At first blush, Governor Romney's answer resembles the traditional
conservative refrain of federalism and states' rights. Upon closer inspection,
Romney is not merely endorsing devolution of governmental responsibility
to states and local government, but to private business wherever possible.
i john a. powell is the Director of the Haas Diversity Research Center (HRDC) and The
Robert D. Haas Chancellor's Chair in Equity and Inclusion, Berkeley School of Law. The
author does not capitalize his name. Stephen Menendian is the senior legal associate at the
Kirwan Institute. The authors would like to thank Brookes Hammock, a Research Associate
at the Kirwan Institute, and Greg Coleridge, director of the American Friends Service Com-
mittee, in particular, for their research support, insights and feedback.
2 CNN Live Republican Debate (CNN television broadcast June 13, 201 ). A transcript of
the debate is available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/i io6/I3/se.02.html.
3 Id.
4 Id. ("You've been a chief executive of a state. I was just in Joplin, Missouri. I've been
in Mississippi and Louisiana and Tennessee and other communities dealing with whether
it's the tornadoes, the flooding, and worse. FEMA is about to run out of money, and there
are some people who say do it on a case-by-case basis and some people who say, you know,
maybe we're learning a lesson here that the states should take on more of this role. How do
you deal with something like that?").
5 Id.
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What is notable, and perhaps inventive, about candidate Romney's reply is
how it blends federalism with an ideology of privatization, even suggesting
a continuum between the two, with progressively desirable loci of control.6
The ideology of privatization stretches beyond traditional federalism with
its states' rights emphasis, and calls for the privatization of government
functions and diminution of public space.7 It is reminiscent of the pre-
New Deal, Jim Crow and Lochner era, which severely curtailed the power
of the federal government and states to regulate the economy.
The ideology of privatization, including the delegation of public
functions, such as food safety inspection, to private entities, is partof a broader
philosophy of market fundamentalism, of deregulation and governmental
non-interference in the market.' These ideologies have been erected upon
a sharp categorical distinction between public and private spheres.9 In this
article, we suggest that an unreflective public/private discourse in law and
popular culture has smuggled through excessive corporate prerogatives.
We illustrate how the public/private distinction has been used as a sword
to create and expand corporate power and influence, and as a shield to
6 Rather than a dichotomous federalism, he is suggesting a public/private spectrum that
runs from the federal government to the private sector. The continuum or spectrum metaphor
is implied when Governor Romney said "go even further," implying that private hands lay
beyond state control in relation to the federal government, and that there is a directional map-
ping that relates these various loci of control. Id.
7 This is true quite literally, in fact. During the debate, the candidates quarreled over
the space program, and whether that was an appropriate government venture, at least going
forward. Id. Newt Gingrich remarked:
If you take all the money we've spent at NASA since we landed on the moon and
you had applied that money for incentives to the private sector, we would today
probably have a permanent station on the moon, three or four permanent stations
in space, a new generation of lift vehicles.
Id.
8 Fahreed Zakaria ascribes this idea of "governmental non-interference in the economy"
as a "cardinal tenant" of the "New Conservatism." Fareed Zakaria, How Today's Conservatism
Lost Touch with Reality, TIME.coM (June I6, ZOlI), http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/o,8599,zo77943,oo.html ("[Rlight now any discussion of government involvement in
the economy - even to build vital infrastructure - is impossible because it is a cardinal tenet
of the new conservatism that such involvement is always and forever bad."). This position is
reminiscent of the Lochner era, which severely curtailed the power of the federal government
andstates to regulate the economy. See Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45, 56 ( 1905). Additionally,
many conservatives and libertarians view the term "investment" as a code word for potentially
"wasteful government spending." Kendra Marr, Santorum tears into Obama's SOTU, POLITICO.
cOM (January 28,201 1, 8:58 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/o I i/48294.html. This
debate over investment and government expenditures was particularly focused in during the
stimulus debates. For a more nuanced view of the debate over investment and government
expenditures, see Will Cain, Let's Make a Deal on U.S. Debt- in t 5 Minutes, CNN.coM (June 22,
201 I 12:45 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2oi i/OPINIONo6/2i/cain.gang.of.six.
9 Just as federalism depends on dichotomous federal and state spheres, the ideology




protect corporate prerogatives from government regulation by disclaiming
or circumscribing an appropriate government role in the market at all.
This article makes the case against excessive corporate prerogative by
revealing ways in which the exercise of corporate power to protect and
relentlessly pursue corporate interests subverts our democracy with harmful
consequences for democratic accountability, civil rights, human rights, the
economy, the environment, privacy, individual freedom and the nation's
welfare. This behavior is not only inimical to the broadest public interest,
but a threat to individual liberty as well, a danger the founders of the
Republic foresaw. The concentration of wealth and influence in corporate
form is an increasingly evident structural distortion in our economy and our
politics.
Although the role of corporations is often framed by the public and
private dichotomy, we contend that this is a mistake. The public/private
distinction papers over meaningful differences between real people and
major corporations. Entrepreneurs, small business owners, farmers, workers
and multi-national corporations are all swept up into the "private sphere."
Consequently, regulations intended to curb the excesses of corporate
behavior wrongly appear equally hostile to "mom and pop" small business
or private citizens, and are viewed as an attack on individual liberty. Yet the
structural features of excessive corporate prerogative, which concentrate
power and influence and result in 'too big to fail,' raise special concerns
that are otherwise invisible through the lens of public/private. We suggest
that a more appropriate way to understand this space is not in terms of
two domains, public and private, but four: public, private, non-public/non-
private, and corporate.
Our case is not a broad attack on corporations per se, but rather a critique
of excessive corporate prerogatives. Nor is it a narrow technical attack,
focusing predominantly on any particular basis of corporate prerogative,
such as of the doctrine of corporate personhood. Our goal is that the
reader develop a more perceptive view of the role of corporations in our
democracy. The case against excessive corporate prerogative is not anti-
corporate or anti-capital, but signifies a misalignment with respect to the
role of corporations in the United States and globally. Corporations made
good servants, but bad masters. In particular, we wish to show why racial
and social justice cannot be achieved without a realignment. 0 As we survey
the bases of excessive corporate prerogative, a conjoined linkage with race
jurisprudence emerges.
In Part I, we identify the grounds for the exercise of excessive corporate
prerogatives as well as their manifestations. Although our argument reaches
beyond law, our focus in this section is the development and emergence
of specific legal doctrines, such as corporate personhood, state action, and
i0 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION SYS-
TEM xv-xvii (2007) (describing the agnostic position on of markets and on fairness or justice).
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commercial speech, among others, which underlay corporate power. These
doctrines are rooted in the public/private distinction or derive from it.
As we trace the use of the public/private distinction as a conduit of
corporate prerogative, we underscore the relationship between excessive
corporate prerogative and civil rights. In particular, we will explore how
the public/private distinction has served in the post-Reconstruction,
Lochner, and modern eras to protect excessive corporate prerogative
while simultaneously circumscribing protection for "discrete and insular
minorities."" While most lawyers have studied the Lochner era, a seminal
period in defining and expanding corporate prerogatives, this era is the
height of Jim Crow, which eviscerated civil rights protections. Yet, the
connection between the two is seldom made. There remains an implicit
understanding that expanding corporate prerogative is inconsistent with
robust civil rights.
In Part II, we shift our focus from the development and exercise of
excessive corporate prerogatives to the re-articulation of the public/private
distinction which undergirds these prerogatives. Initially, we will assert
that the public/private distinction has been fundamentally misconceived.
The ideology of privatization and governmental non-interference in the
economy assumes a conceptually clear public/private distinction. Building
on the insights of critical legal scholars, we will argue not only that this
distinction is empirically amorphous and conceptually flawed, but that a
very different set of domains has been constructed.
Rather than simply public/private spheres, we suggest that there are in
fact four domains, publi'c, private, non-public/non-private, and corporate,
that have been erected in law and practice. These domains are not static
and.fixed, but exist in a dynamic relationship. The binary public/private
dichotomy, either as a legal distinction or popular heuristic, generates a
blind spot that obscures the ways in which corporate behavior is distorting
democratic processes and accumulating upon itself further prerogatives.
We offer a re-articulation of this space as a way of better observing these
dynamics.
The corporate sphere is roughly captured by the phrase "private
sector" in Governor Romney's remarks, which is not really "private" in the
traditional sense at all. In addition, there is a sphere that is neither private
nor public nor a domain of corporate power, although excessive corporate
prerogatives may be .exercised within it. We call that sphere "non-public/
non-private." Individuals that inhabit this sphere enjoy neither the rights
of the public in the public sphere, nor the individual liberties associated
with the private sphere. This sphere is inhabited by many "discrete and
insular minorities" and other marginalized groups. We will show how the
exercise of excessive corporate prerogative is a threat to the private sphere
i i United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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as well as the public and non-public/non-private.
In Part III, we call for a realignment of corporate space in relation to
democracy and the public good. In a sense, we flip the question posed by
John King: "what is the role of government in United States?" by asking:
"what is the role of the private sector?" To help envision a realignment of
corporate space in the United States, we turn to the eminent twentieth
century philosopher John Rawls. Rawls distinguished between a
capitalist welfare state and a property-owning democracy as two societal
arrangements with different roles for corporate institutions."2 The contrast
illuminates current arrangements with imagined alternatives. We also
explore the manifestations of excessive corporate prerogative, particularly
as the forces of globalization have matured. In a globalized market context,
the profit-motivating interests of major corporations may no longer align
with the best interests of workers, the nation or even the economy. In
order to facilitate a realignment of the role of corporations, we explore the
potentially countervailing forces of popular democracy, organized labor, the
regulatory state, expanded human and civil rights, and an appropriately
constituted corporation.
I. EXCESSIVE CORPORATE PREROGATIVE: EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT
In 2010, the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling striking down
a key provision of the McCain-Feingold sponsored Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002." The Act was designed to curb the potentially
distorting and corrupting influence of money in politics. 4 In Citizens
United v. FEC, the Court held that corporations enjoy First Amendment
12 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 258-84 (1971) (describing justice in a property-
owning democracy); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 135-140 (2001) (com-
paring the differing relationships that the property-owning democracy and the capitalist wel-
fare state have with social institutions).
13 Citizens United v. FEC, I3O S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
14 See Brief of Amici Curiae Senator John McCain et al. in Support of Appellee at I,
Citizens United v. FEC, I3o S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. o8-205), 2oo6 WL 369341, at 01. According
to Senator McCain and the other principal sponsors of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002,
There is no basis for suggesting that concerns about the potential overwhelming,
distorting, and corrupting influence of unleashing massive corporate and union
war chests for use in unfettered express candidate advocacy are no longer compel-
ling. That our electoral process would soon be dominated by corporate and union
spending if the Court were to use this case as the occasion to roll back the long-
standing prohibition on express advocacy by business corporations and unions is
beyond serious question.
Id. at 9. See also JOHN MCCAIN WITH MARK SALTER, WORTH THE FIGHTING FOR: A
MEMOIR 337 (2OOZ) ("By the time I became a leading advocate of campaign finance
reform, I had come to appreciate that the public's suspicions were not always mis-
taken. Money does buy access in Washington, and access increases influence that
often results in benefiting the few at the expense of the many.").
2011-20121
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rights to spend money on political campaigns." This decision represents
more than several decades of expansion of corporate speech rights, and
the culmination of nearly two centuries of jurisprudence. The growth of
corporate power began in the early years of the republic. In this part of the
article, we will survey its expansion and highlight critical developments,
beginning with the doctrine of corporate personhood. 16
A. Corporate Individualism and the Doctrine of Corporate Personhood
A product of the Enlightenment and Reformation, classical liberalism
was the prevailing ideology of American society in the early years of the
American republic. 7 A central tenant of classical liberalism was distrust of
centralized power. 8 This expression of classical liberalism is visible not
only in the language of the Declaration of Independence, but also in the
design of the Constitution, with its federal system, limited government,
and balance of powers.19 This was a political system designed in contrast
to the centralized political authority embodied in monarchism from which
Enlightenment thought, and the American colonists, rebelled. 0
Influenced by the writings of Adam Smith and John Locke, America's
colonial leaders were not merely wary of the concentration of political
power, they were also concerned with the concentration of economic
power." Thomas Jefferson firmly believed that economic independence
was a foundation of individual freedom, expressed in the ideal of the
independent farmer."2 As American capitalism took root, he feared the
15 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
16 For a discussion focused more on the issue of corporate prerogative under the Four-
teenth Amendment, see john a. powell & Caitlin Watt, Corporate Prerogative, Race, and Identity
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 32 CAlRDozo L. REV. 885 (201 i).
17 SCOTT R. BOWMAN, 'lYE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL TlOUGHT:
LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 5-7 (1996).
I8 Id. at 6.
19 See john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond Enlightenment
Jurisprudence, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1035, 1053-58 (201O).
20 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
Id.
21 BowMAN, supra note 17, at 5-Io. Importantly, to this generation of political leaders, cor-
porations were associated with monopolies, which necessarily concentrated economic advan-
tage. The antimonopoly sentiment of the enlightenment generation was prevalent. Id at 8-.
22 ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 21 (1998) ("Jefferson's lifelong friend
and colleague, James Madison, agreed that the small, independent farmer constituted the
'best basis of public liberty."').
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concentration of wealth in corporate form, particularly banks, which
threatened the independence of workers and farmers.2 3
Adam Smith, one of the leading figures in the Scottish Enlightenment,
which was especially influential in the early American Republic, voiced
similar concerns in his critique of mercantilism.
2 4
Smith [had a] genuine fear of institutions, as shown in his critique
of the system of mercantilism, of monopolies, and of political or
economic institutions that favor some individuals over others. Smith
questions the existence of "joint-stock companies" (corporations),
except in exceptional circumstances, because the institutionalization
of management power separated from ownership creates institutional
management power cut loose from responsibility. Smith's fear is that
such institutions might become personified, so that one would regard
them as real entities and hence treat them as incapable of being
dismantled."
With these concerns in mind, in early United State history corporations
were created exclusively through state charters and held under the direct
control of the state. 6 In the colonial era, corporations were chartered by the
Crown. In each case, corporations were chartered to serve the public:
The first corporations were chartered to enlist private capital for such
public facilities as bridges, turnpikes, and urban water systems, with
investors deriving their profits from tolls and user fees. Their public
purpose also justified legislatures in granting them monopoly privileges
as to route and location, as well as the right to seize private property
under the state's power of eminent domain."
Corporations were public entities, operating to serve the public and
the interests of the state. As a public institution, the legal theory of the
corporation was that of an artificial entity. Chief Justice Marshall articulated
this theory for the Supreme Court, explaining: "A corporation is an artificial
23 See John F. Manley, American Liberalism and the Democratic Dream: Transcending the Amer-
ican Dream, IO POI'Y STUD. REV., no. 1, 1990 at 89, 97 ("In 1817 [Jefferson] complained that
the banks' mania 'is raising up a monied aristocracy in our country which has already set the
government at defiance'... A year eailier he said he hoped the United States would reject
the British example and 'crush in it's [sic] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations
which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the
laws of our country." (citations omitted)).
24 See Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 65, 70-73 (1987). For more on the influence of Enlightenment
thought on both the framers of the United States and contemporary law, see powell & Me-
nendian, supra note 19, at io39-83.
25 PATRICIA H. WERHANE, ADAM SMITH AND His LEGACY FOR MODERN CAPITALISM 125
(199I) (footnote omitted).
26 "Only seven private business corporations were chartered under the colonial regime,
whereas the number climbed to forty in the first decade after the Revolution and passed three
hundred during the commercial boom of the 1790s." CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLU-
TION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 18I5 - 1845, at 44-45 (199I).
27 Id. at 45.
2O011-2012]
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being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law." 8
The artificial entity theory drew upon the British common law view that
"the corporation as nothing more than an artificial creature of the state,
subject to government imposed limitations and restrictions." 9 Because
the state creates the corporation, the corporation is expected to serve the
state in performing some public function, and cannot assert rights against
the state.30 In this view, corporations are part of a larger scheme of public
service. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall explained that "[tihe objects for
which a corporation is created are universally such as the government
wishes to promote."31 Corporations were not merely creatures of the state,
they were public entities.
Today, we may think of certain state subsidized monopolies, such as
utility companies, in this way. The state grants a charter or exclusive rights
to the corporation to perform services for the community. In turn, the
corporation enjoys business privileges, even monopoly service rights, but
must abide by certain regulations. This understanding is incommensurate
to the early republican conception of a corporation. Corporations were not
merely public servants, they were public institutions. To illustrate this
point, as a corollary to the power to create corporations through charter,
states could revoke the charter of corporations and thus terminate them.
In fact, even as late as the 1880s, quo warranto proceedings to revoke the
charters of corporations that engaged in behavior contrary to the public
interest were common.32
One of the first steps in the emancipation of the corporate form from
state control was the landmark decision of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.33
In Dartmouth College, the Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether Dartmouth was a private institution or subject to the control of
the state legislature.3 4 The specific issue before the Court was whether
28 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, at 636 (1819).
29 Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HAST-
INGS L.J. 577,580 (99o).
30 Id.
31 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 637. He goes on to say: "They [referring to
corporations] are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consider-
ation, and in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant." Id. However, it is important to
note that Chief Justice Marshall goes on to say that the fact that a charter of incorporation has
been granted will not change "the character of [the] institution" from a private one to a public
one. Id. at 638-39. "The character of civil institutions does not grow out of their incorporation,
but out of the manner in which they are formed, and the objects for which they are created."
Id. at 638.
32 Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 221, 248 (1999).
In fact, it was a quo warranto petition that began the legal proceedings against Standard Oil,
after the initial failure of federal authorities to do so under the Sherman Antitrust Act. RON
CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 331 (1998).




the New Hampshire Legislature's attempt to replace the President of the
University violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution.3" To make
that determination, the Court confronted the further question, disputed
by the parties, whether the 1769 charter was a "grant of political power
... creat[ing] ... a civil institution,' 36 for the benefit of the province, or
whether the charter created a private institution intended to benefit the
"bounty of the donors. 37
Each of the pre-revolutionary colleges were royally chartered, but
at the request of the colonies rather than the initiative of the Crown.38
Consequently, charters to establish colleges were granted, one per colony,
with each institution representing that colony.39 These colleges were
understood to be "emanation[s] of the polity."' While many of these elite
institutions, such as Harvard, Yale and Princeton are regarded as private,
this has not always been the case. They were founded by and to serve
specific needs of the colonies, in particular, to train and prepare clergy for
the colony's parishioners.4 1.For example, Harvard College was founded
in 1636 to educate ministers in the new world to ensure the continuity
of religious practice and teaching.4" In New England's First Fruits, the
motivating concern behind Harvard's founding was described as fear of an
"illiterate [ministry]" once the current crop of ministers retired or "lie in
the dust. ' 43 Although the subsequently founded colonial colleges may have
35 Id. at 626-27.
36 Id. at 629.
37 Id. at 64o.
38 See JURGEN HERBST, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: AMERICAN COLLEGE GOVERNMENT, 1636-
1819, at 1 (1982).
39 The colonies and their respective institutions are as follows: Massachusetts - Harvard
University; Virginia - College of William & Mary; Connecticut -Yale University; New Jersey
- Princeton University; New York - Columbia University; Pennsylvania - University of Penn-
sylvania; Rhode Island - Brown University; New Hampshire - Dartmouth University. Id. app.
A at 244-46. For a list of institutions of higher education chartered between 1636-1820, see
id. app. A at 244-53. The fact that only one college was founded per colony further suggests
that these institutions were much like other state monopolies, granted to serve particular
public purposes.
40 Roger L. Geiger, Ten Generations of Higher American Education, in AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION IN THE 'PWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
38, 38-39 (Phillip Altbach et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). In particular, Harvard, the College of Wil-
liam and Mary, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, the University of Pennsylvania, Brown, Dartmouth,
and Rutgers were the 9 colleges created before the Revolutionary War, and each represented
a different colony. See HERBST, supra note 38, app. A at 244-46; see also Lester F. Goodchild,
History of Higher Education in the United States, in I HIGHER EDUCATION IN THIE UNITED STATES:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 319-21 (James JF Forest & Kevin Kinser eds., zooz)..
41 Geiger, supra note 40, at 40-41 ("The founding documents of [Harvard, Yale, and Wil-
liam and Mary] speak to the aim of educating ministers.... [Tihe founders of Yale intended to
provide education 'for Publick [sic] employment both in Church & Civil State.").
42 HERBST, supra note 38, at 5.
43 NEW ENGLAND'S FIRST FRUITS: WITH DIVERS OTHER SPECIAL MATTERS CONCERNING
2011-20121
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increasingly emphasized secular concerns, particularly the new natural
philosophy of the scientific revolution and the enlightenment, their aims
were no less public. 44 These colleges not only prepared clerical leaders
but also educated the future colonial leaders in the classics, and political
theory.4
Throughout the colonial era, these institutions were understood to
be public or at least quasi-public institutions serving particular public
needs for the public good.' They were given generous tax abatements, 47
land grants, subsidies, and other forms of public support in light of.these
purposes.41 In Dartmouth College, the jury noted that the college had been
endowed by two states, Vermont and New Hampshire, with "lands of great
value. ' 49 In addition, according to Judge Henry Friendly, at the time of
the decision, Dartmouth College was "exempted from New Hampshire
taxation, confer[red] degrees ... essential to the obtaining of governmental.
licenses, and now secures a fourth of its income from the United States.
. .,,5 In spite of the generous public investment and subsidy and a clear
public purpose, Chief Justice Marshall, writing on behalf of the Court in
1819, decided that Dartmouth was a private institution. Inhis view, the
attempt by the legislature to replace the governing body, a right it had
long enjoyed, violated the Constitution."' According to the lore, the Chief
Justice was ultimately swayed by Dartmouth Alumnus, Senator Daniel
Webster's emotional oral argument.5 "
The decision laid the foundation for the "privatization" of most of
the colonial (Ivy League) colleges during the nineteenth, century.5 3 To,
illustrate the ambivalence around the issue, the privatization of the colonial
TAT COUNTRY 23 (Joseph Sabin ed. 1865) (1643).
44 See Geiger, supra note 40, at 42-43.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 43-44; see also HERBST, supra note 38, at 8.
47 See HERBST, supra note 38, at I I.
48 See id. at 8. Harvard College was given a permanent tax abatement and land subsidy.
Id. at8, II.
49 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,518, 538 (1819).'
50 HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUM-
BRA IO (1969).
51 Id. at 633-34, 654.
52 CRAIG R. SMITH, DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE ORATORY OF CIVIL RELIGION 47 (2005).
Webster proclaimed:
Sir, you may destroy this little institution; it is weak; it is in your hands! I know
it is one of the lesser lights in the literary horizon of our country. You may put it
out. But if you do, you must carry through your work! You must extinguish, one
after another, all those great lights of science which, for more than a century, have
thrown their radiance over our land! It is, Sir, as I have said, a small college. And
yet, there are those who love it.
Id.
53 See Geiger, supra note 40, at 47.
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colleges occurred very gradually.54 For example, Harvard College did not
become dfficially private until 1865.15 By deciding that Dartmouth was
a private institution, not a public one, Justice Marshall not only laid the
foundation for the future program of colleges and universities around the
country, which were largely private in form, but also for the "rise of the
American business corporation."' 6 Marshall participated in an effort to free
corporations from the control of the state.
Ultimately, the progressive release of corporate charters from the
control of the state and concomitant expansion of corporate rights was a
product of the work of lawyers and judges removed or safely insulated from
democratic processes. "[B]y the end of the War of 1812... corporations were
orily beginning to win two of their cardinal privileges: limited liability of
stockholders for corporate debts and corporate freedom from interference
by'the'state. These privileges were won not in legislative halls but in the
courts." 7 The Dartmouth decision was merely the beginning.
Americans in the antebellum period shared the founding generation's
mistrust of concentrated political and economic power. It was in this context
that theination's political leaders contested the merits and constitutionality
of the First Bank of the United States, culminating in a debate whether to
renew the charter of the Second Bank of the United States in 1816.58 The
pro-charter movement used the Dartmouth decision to cast the corporate
form as a private individual, to distance the widespread association of the
corporate form with state-chartered monopolies, and to alleviate fear over
the concentration of wealthy interests.5 9 Several states adopted general
incorporationacts, further severing the connection between the corporate
form and the state.60 General incorporation acts also broke the close
connection between public purpose and corporate organization. As this
54 Id.
55 See RONALD STORY, THE FORGING OF AN ARISTOCRACY: HARVARD & THE BOSTON UPPER
CLASS, 180o-i870, at 158-59 (1980). For an in-depth analysis of the privatization of the early
public institutions of higher learning, see JOHN S. WHITEHEAD, TIE SEPARATION OF COLLEGE
AND STATE: COLUMBIA, DARTMOUTH, HARVARD AND YALE, 1776-1876, at 191-240 (1973).
56 R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 245
(2001).
57 SELLERS, supra note 26, at 46-47.
58 Id. at 62-63, 68-69, 71-72. It was also a major question to determine whether the Bank
was a private or public entity. See Gerald Turkel, The Public/Private Distinction: Approaches to the
Critique of Legal Ideology, 22 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 8o1, 8 11 (1988) (discussing Osborn v. Bank of
the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)). For a discussion of the private/public distinction, see
infra Part II.
59 BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 50 ("In this fashion, the legal fiction acquired ideological
significance. As the corporate individual became identified with the entrepreneur, the busi-
ness corporation lost its negative association with the privileged few - the commercial and
financial interests aligned with the Bank of the United States and the old guard of the Fed-
eralist Party.").
6o Id. at 51.
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process occurred, the corporate form increasingly acquired a private cast.
As a consequence of these accommodations, corporations uneasily
occupied the public/private framework. As artificial entities chartered by
the state, corporations were quasi-public entities, subject to state control.6"
However, since they were operated in many cases by private citizens and
generated revenues for private investors, they were not entirely public
entities either. The Supreme Court would attempt to clarify the issue,
but ended up complicating matters. On account of the growing use of the
corporate form of organization, and the increasingly uncertain character of
the corporation, questions arose whether and to what extent corporations
could sue or be suedunder the Constitution.6" Were they persons under the
Constitution? More critically, were they citizens?
In 1839, the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Taney delivering
the opinion, rejected Daniel Webster's argument that 'a corporation
was a "citizen" within the meaning and protection of the privileges and
immunities clause6 3 of Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.64
However, just five years later, in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad
Co. v. Letson the Court upheld a claim that corporations were "citizens"
within the meaning of the Diversity of Citizenship Clause of Article III,
Section 2.65 Those are the only two instances of the word 'citizen' in the
original Constitution. Taking both holdings together, corporations were
citizens -under the Constitution in one context, for the purpose of suing and
being sued in federal court, but not a citizen for the purpose of enjoying
the privileges and immunities of citizenship. 66 Corporations had been
extended a quasi-citizenship status for jurisdictional purposes under the
Diversity of Citizenship Clause. Politicians and jurists wondered whether,
as a logical corollary, such a conclusion - citizenship with respect to diversity
citizenship (for standing purposes), but not privileges and immunities -
extended to other groups, such as free blacks.
The Letson decision, granting corporations standing under the Diversity
61 See, e.g., OscAR HANDLIN AND MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY io6, 112, 120 .(2d ed. 1969).
62 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS 72 (1978).
63 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Priv-
ileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). The privileges and immunities
clause is not to be confused with the privileges or immunities clause of Section I of the Four-
teenth Amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
64 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839).
65 Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555
(1844). The Court continued to assert the artificial entity theory. Id.
66 Id. at 555 ("A corporation created by a state to perform its functions under the author-
ity of that state and only suable there, though it may have members out of the state, seems to
us to be a person, though an artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state, and therefore
entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state.").
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of Citizenship Clause, was a major step towards corporate personhood
and expanded corporate power and prerogative. Since corporations could
"sue and be sued," these cases extended federal judicial protection to
corporations against the states and even Congress. Legal standing to sue
meant that corporations were "capable of entering into contractual relations
in a market economy," and could enforce those rights in courts of law.67
The logic behind granting diversity citizenship to corporations while
denying that status in the context of the privileges and immunities clause
was the premise that a corporation's "rights began and ended with the
[corporate] charter. '68 However, free blacks, especially those who might
have enjoyed access to federal court through diversity jurisdiction, were not
similarly prescribed. Natural persons are not bound by charters. Therefore,
the corporate charter argument was not available as a ground for precluding
free blacks from enjoying access to federal courts under the privileges and
immunities clause. This was a major concern for southern slaveholders and
southern political elites.
Article IV affords national citizens the "privileges and immunities of
citizens in the other states."6 9 If blacks were federal citizens in one state,
they might invoke Article IV protections against discriminatory laws in
other states. This not only would have disturbed southern states with more
stringent racial codes, but would have also threatened Southern attempts to
protect and fortify slavery as an institution. The freedoms blacks enjoyed
in Northern states could be theoretically exercised in the South.70 Not only
would such a conclusion potentially subject every southern race code to
federal judicial review, but it would also stymie efforts to strengthen fugitive
slave laws, which southerners believed were necessary to quell abolitionist
agitation. To resolve this dilemma, several Supreme Court Justices seemed
open to reversing the Court's nascent corporate personhood doctrine under
the Diversity of Citizenship Clause, rather than admit the possibility that
blacks might also enjoy the same citizenship rights and, therefore, enjoy
the privileges and immunities of citizenship as well.7
In fact, many free blacks were citizens of their respective states and
67 BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 52-53.
68 AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1837-1857, at 131 (2oo6).
69 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
70 See ALLEN, supra note 68, at 132.
71 See ALLEN, supra note 68, at 13 1. Justices Campbell, Catron, and Daniel wished to shut
corporations out of diversity jurisdiction rather than admit that southern racial policies might
be open to challenge in federal courts under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. This
bloc led to a polarized Court, as the other justices felt that this position was too extreme. But
the remaining members of the Court were .unwilling to allow even the slightest possibility
that free blacks might enjoy quasi-citizenship rights, and if this meant doing the same for
corporations, so be it. Id. at 132.
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enjoyed access to their state courts, just as corporations did within their
state of incorporation.7" Therefore, did free blacks who were citizens of their
respective states, then, also count as federal citizens under the Diversity of
Citizenship Clause for the same jurisdictional purpose: to sue and be sued?
If so, the answer would parallel the logic of the Supreme Court in creating
corporate diversity citizenship. That is precisely why federal circuit Judge
Wells reached that conclusion in 1854 in the initial federal iteration of the
Dred Scott case, Scottv. Sandford. 3 Judge Wells held that Scott was "enough
of a citizen to be covered by the diverse-citizenship clause," but carefully
limited his holding to Article III, Section 2.14 In reversing Judge Wells, by
infamously holding that no black person, free or slave, were citizens under
the United States Constitution, under either Article III or Article IV, Chief
Justice Taney's opinion on behalf of the Supreme Court risked closing off
Article III access to federal corporate litigants.7 -
The accommodation by which Chief Justice Taney preserved his
Court's rulings on corporate standing, while barring access to federal courts
for blacks, was the solution of anti-black federal citizenship. Chief Justice
Taney structured the Dred Scott holding on a racial basis, and did so by
creating an extraordinary subcategory for blacks.76 He singled out blacks as
uniquely excepted from federal citizenship, holding that persons of African
descent were not, and could never become, citizens of the United States."
Taney deployed the "history of enslavement and subsequent degradation
within American legal culture" as the basis for this unequal standing.78
In this way, he preserved access to federal courts for quasi-citizens, and
did not disturb the citizenship rights of other "subaltern segments of
the population, such as white women and minors and other nonwhites
in general."79 Only blacks were excluded from the rights of citizenship
under the Federal Constitution and, therefore, federal standing. The
Reconstruction Amendments reversed the Taney theory of anti-black
federal citizenship, but they inadvertently provided a stronger vehicle for
72 See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 62, at 277.
73 See id. at 277-78. This holding mirrored the Taney court's handling of corporate citi-
zenship: counting for diversity purposes, but not privileges and immunities purposes. In vir-
tually every case in which free blacks tried to make citizenship claims under Article IV, they
were rebuffed. Id. at 68.
74 Id. at 277 (emphasis removed).
75 ALLEN, supra note 68, at 161; see also Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407
(1856) ("They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and
so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.").
76 See Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 422; see also supra text accompanying notes 68-75.
77 Scott, 6o U.S. (I9 How.) at 422.
78 ALLEN, supra note 68, at 163.




The natural entity theory, formulated by Otto Gierke, began to
eclipse the artificial entity theory of corporate personhood. 80 This theory
asserts that corporations are wholly distinct juridical entities with rights
separate from those of its creator.8 ' The radical change in corporate theory
undergirded a shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Under natural entity
theory, a corporation may assert constitutional rights, enjoying standing to
sue and be sued, and govern itself.8" Following the persistence of corporate
attorneys and justices such as Justice Field, courts slowly adopted the
natural entity theory.83 Justice Field advocated a reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment that would advance robust corporate personhood s4 The
Fourteenth Amendment extended its protections to "citizens" and
"persons. ' 85 This language offered ample room to extend corporations
constitutional protections regardless of whether they were citizens, clothing
them in equal protection and due process rights.
Although an omnibus measure, one of the primary objectives of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to extend federal citizenship rights denied in
DredScott and end the super-subordinate status of blacks. In the Slaughter-
House Cases, the first instance of a case coming before the Supreme
Court under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court affirmed that the
"one pervading purpose" behind the Amendment was the citizenship
guarantee for former slaves and the protection of that status.86 The case
concerned a Louisiana statute granting a corporate monopoly to a New
Orleans slaughterhouse for butchering livestock. The aggrieved butchers
of New Orleans parish filed suit, claiming a violation of their privileges
and immunities rights, among other grounds, under the Fourteenth
Amendment.87 The Supreme Court upheld the statute under the
80 See O'rro GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 67-69 (E.W. Maitland
trans., 19oo); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, 'HE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 66-71 (1992) (detailing the introduction of the natural en-
tity theory into American jurisprudence).
81 Frederic William Maitland, Introduction to O'rro GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE
MIDDLE AGE 67-69 (E.W. Maitland trans., I9oo), at xxxviii; HOROWITZ, supra note 80, at 75-77.
82 HoRowrrz, supra note 8o, at 10O-O.
83 HOROWITZ, supra note 8o, at 69-70; see, e.g., Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 18 F.
385,403 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883).
84 HOROWITZ, supra note 8o, at 69-70.
85 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
86 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1872) ("[Oin the most casual ex-
amination of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one
pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none
of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security
and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him.").
87 Id. at 57-58.
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Constitution, but "set in motion a monumental debate on the Court.""
The Slaughterhouse Cases addressed the question of federal citizenship
rights, including the right to work for whites, and the interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment for blacks. The butchers of New Orleans asserted
that being forced to work for a corporate monopoly was not only a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment's protections, including the privileges and
immunities of federal citizenship, but also a badge and incident of slavery
in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 9 In denying those claims, the
Court distinguished between the privileges and immunities of state and
federal citizenship. In doing so, the Court reduced the rights of federal
citizenship to a pittance, trivial concerns or those that had pre-existed the
enactment. In a single decision, the Supreme Court limited the rights of
blacks and white workers and expanded the reach of corporations. It is a
decision that remains good law, and stands as a powerful example of the
interaction between race/class and corporate power.
Ultimately, however, it was the dissenting Justices in Slaughterhouse that
took up the reigns of the Marshall Court to expand corporate prerogative.
The composition of the Supreme Court dramatically shifted between
1877 and 1882, and Justice Field's arguments for corporate Constitutional
rights quickly gained traction. In 1878, Justice Field bitterly dissented
in the Sinking Funds Cases,9° in which the Court found no constitutional
objection to a charter that required a railroad to keep a portion of its
income to meet certain debts.91 By the early 1880s, Justice Field and a
more business-friendly Court initiated a dramatic expansion of corporate
Constitutional rights.9" As a first step, they seemed determined to strike
down state regulations of railroad rates. 93 While the freedmen would be
denied the protection of hostile and oppressive states, corporations would
be protected.
88 BOWMAN, supra note 17, at 55.
89 This was not a farfetched legal theory. The Republican Party had marshaled its rheto-
ric around the idea of free soil and free labor. See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR,
FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970). The as-
sertion that having to work for corporation was a form of slavery would be asserted by white
worker as well as the Party in the early period of industrialization. See, e.g., DAVID R. ROEDIGER,
ThE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 65 (1991).
During this period there was a strong sense that corporation was a serious challenge to free-
dom and not just another public or private entity. See FONER, supra, at 22-23.
9o Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 731-44 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting).
9i Id. at 726.
92 DAVID H. GANS & DOUGLAS T. KENDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER,
A CAPITALIST JOKER: ThE STRANGE ORIGINS, DISTURBING PAST AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF
CORPORATE PERSONHOOD IN AMERICAN LAW 22-28 (20IO), http://www.theusconstitution.org/
upload/fck/file/File.storage/A%2oCapitalist%zoJoker(i).pdf. One of the new entrants on the
court was Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller, a former corporate lawyer. BOWMAN, supra note 17,
at 56.
93 Id. at 36.
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In 1886, the Court heard Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Co., concerning whether state and county taxes assessed to a railroad,
particularly for the value of fences, were constitutional. 94 The State of
California imposed taxes on the value of property, but distinguished between
natural persons and "railroad[s] and other quasi public corporations" in
making property valuations.' The importance of the case is not its holding,
but the extraordinary insertion into the court syllabus, ostensibly in the
name of Chief Justice Waite, stating:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether
the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the
opinion that it does. 6
Thus, in the syllabus to the Santa Clara decision, the Court asserted
that corporations unequivocally were people under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 97 The question of corporate personhood had not been argued
or briefed in the case, nor did the Court's opinion explain this mysterious
dictum. According to some accounts, this statement may have been inserted
by a zealous court reporter, and was not in fact a remark of the Chief Justice
despite its attribution.98 The syllabus does not have any legal force, but
regardless of its origin, Santa Clara's infamous dictum became accepted
law.99 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, and in view of the Constitution,
corporations were now "people." This represented a dramatic break from
previous legal theory, and laid the foundation for a series of decisions
expanding corporate power that continues to this day. °0
94 Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 397 (1886).
95 Id. at 404. In particular, the state required that the property be taxed according to
its value. Id. However, it said that the value of a security against a debt could be deducted
from the valuation, "except as to railroad and other quasi public corporations." Id. On this
ground, the plaintiffs said that this imposed an unequal burden on railroads, and denied
them equal protection of laws. Id. at 410. From our perspective, these sorts of distinctions -
between corporate persons and natural persons - are well founded. After all, a corporation can
accumulate much greater debt or hold much greater debt than a natural person.
96 Id. at 396.
97 See id.
98 GANs & KENDALL, supra note 92, at 26.
Whatever was said at oral argument, the Court never actually reached the constitu-
tional questions in its final opinion, much to the disappointment of Justice Field.
... Undeterred, the court reporter - who was once the President of the Board of
a New York railroad corporation himself - included the report of oral argument,
even after Chief Justice Waite noted to the reporter that'we avoided meeting the
constitutional question in the decision.
Id.
99 Id.
IOO It is noteworthy that the Court has clothed corporations with Fourth Amendment
rights to be free from random inspection. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); See
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). This topic, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
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The expansion of corporate constitutional protections in the
Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction periods coincided with
momentous changes in state law. By 1870, most states had passed laws
permitting "incorporation as a general right rather than a special legislative
grant." 0 1 In 1889, New Jersey offered interstate corporations a way of
avoiding quo warranto proceedings in exchange for franchise taxes. 10 This
was the first race to the bottom, a state-by-state progression of releasing
corporations from state regulatory controls over their former creations."3
Additionally, New Jersey revised its general incorporation statute to
allow one corporation to hold stock in another, "ignit[ing] a revolution in
corporation law that has yet to run its course." °4 These laws provided a
critical escape hatch for embattled trusts, following the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Instead of operating as a trust, companies like Standard Oil could
reorganize as holding companies and operate nationwide. 05
The average American may have been wary of the expansion of corporate
power and prerogatives, given their long association with concentrated
economic power and wealthy interests, particularly during the onset of
industrialization and the emergence of the gilded era. Consequently,
much of the expansion of corporate power occurred through undemocratic
processes: courts rather than legislatures. American jurists played a pivotal
role in the development and expansion of corporate power, "[a]rmed with
little precedent, but gifted with considerable ingenuity."'
0 6
Lawyers were the shock troops of capitalism. The bar mushroomed
as the market proliferated contractual relationships.
... [L]awyers' decisive contribution to the expanding market was
accomplished outside the limelight of electoral politics and legislation....
With impressive creativity and speed, the legal profession supplied a
new law.
Not even the wiliest lawyer/politicians could have extracted the law
required by expansive capital from legislatures vulnerable to a broad
electorate still imbued with premarket values. But in the courts the
lawyers' technical expertise could not be democratically challenged. By
taking control of the state courts and asserting through them their right
to shape the law to entrepreneurial ends, lawyer/judges during the first
half of the nineteenth century fashioned a legal revolution."°7
This revolution - the development of the doctrine of corporate
personhood, the fiction that corporations are people under law - originated
from the same Court that sanctioned "separate but equal" in Plessy v.
1 BowMAN, supra note 17, at 37.
102 Rowe, supra note 32, at 248.
103 BowMAN, supra note 17, at 37.
1o4 Id. at 6o.
105 CHERNOW, supra note 32, at 332.
1o6 BowMAN, supra note 17, at 36.
107 SELLERS, supra note 26, at 47-48.
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Ferguson. 8 Both doctrines were fashioned from the same cloth: the
same judicial actors, the same judicial philosophy, and the same textual
provisions.' The evisceration of the Fourteenth Amendment's protections
for freedmen, begun in Slaughter-House,"' culminated in the Plessy"'
decision in 1896.112
The post-Reconstruction Court not only interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to create and protect corporate prerogatives while undermining
the protections for freedmen and their progeny, it applied these provisions
narrowly to other previously subaltern groups. How would the clarified
federal and state citizenship status and concomitant citizenship and
personhood rights for women be applied?
Just one year after Slaughterhouse, the Court affirmed its narrow reading
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Bradwell v. Illinois."3 In
Bradwell, the Court denied the argument that a state's refusal to grant a
license to practice law to women violated the Fourteenth Amendment."4
Although the ground of this decision was the Privileges and Immunities
Clause,"' the opinion cast doubt on the degree to which women would
enjoy other Fourteenth Amendment protections. The early women's rights
movement had grown out of the abolitionist movement, and called for not
simply the abolition of slavery, but for equal rights for both blacks and
women." 6 Women's organizations played a critical role in the Amendment's
passage." 7 How would clarified state and federal citizenship rights and
io8 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541-542, 549 (i896) (determining that Louisiana
statute requiring railroads to provide "equal but separate accommodations for the white, and
colored races" was not unconstitutional under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (9S4); see also powell & Watt, supra
note 16, at 888.
io9 Justice Field not only joined the majority in Plessy, but he also dissented in Strauder
v. West Virginia, which held that a West Virginia statute discriminated in the selection of jurors
was "a denial of the equal protection of the laws to a colored man .... " Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879); see powell & Watt, supra note 16, at 888. He was also personally
opposed to the Equal Protection Clause. powell & Watt, supra note 16, at 888 (citing HOWARD
JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT, THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY," AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 195 (1968)).
Iio Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. ('6 Wall.) 36 (1872).
I5i Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537.
112 See powell &Watt, supra note 16, at 887-90.
113 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
114 Id. at 138-39.
115 Id. at 14O-41.
I16 VALERIE BRYSON, FEMINIST POLITICAL THEORY 38-39,47, 90 (1992).
117 Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case for Equal Treat-
ment Under the Fourteenth Amendment, I DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 89, 1O2, I sO (1994). Wom-
en's rights activists Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton also demanded in their
petitions for ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment that woman suffrage be included in
the text of the Amendment. Id. at 1 I0.
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other Fourteenth Amendment protections be applied to women? It was
reasonable to expect that women would enjoy equal protection rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, as the Court solidified corporate
standing and other corporate rights under that charter, it denied the claims
of women and freed slaves."'
In their infancy in America, corporations were creatures of the state, and
subordinate to the state. Moreover, corporations were public institutions,
chartered to serve the public good. Corporations were defined by their
charter and could not act beyond the charter. As corporations gained
standing rights, personhood, and eventually acquired constitutional
protections and rights, they were gradually emancipated from state controls
and restrictive charters. With this freedom they began to lobby legislatures
and to influence political and policy outcomes. No longer a pawn, they
were now a major player.
B. State Action Doctrine
During the early summer of 2010, as the midterm campaign was gearing
up, Rand Paul uncomfortably admitted his opposition to parts of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.' 9 Avowing personal opposition to racial discrimination,
he disclaimed a role for government in monitoring private discrimination.10
In his view, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and by implication, the bulk of
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, impermissibly reach beyond the sphere
of state action and into private conduct.' His arguments are not only
reminiscent of the Southern opposition to the civil rights movement, but
more critically, of the Plessy era Supreme Court. His arguments belie a post-
Reconstruction jurisprudence that remains curiously intact, despite the
rehabilitation of Justice John Harlan, and his famous dissents. In this part,
we will explore the origin of the state action doctrine, in contradistinction
118 In Connecticut Genera/Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, Justice Hugo Black expressed frus-
tration with the Court's extensive use of the Fourteenth Amendment to define corporate
rights. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 89-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Black,
This amendment sought to prevent discrimination by the states against classes or
races.... Yet, of the cases in this Court in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
applied during the first fifty years after its adoption, less than one-half of I per
cent. invoked it in protection of the negro race, and more than 50 per cent. asked
that its benefits be extended to corporations.
Id.
ii9 See James Joyner, Rand Paul, the Civil Rights Act, and Private Discrimination, OUTSIDE
THE BELTWAY (May 20, 20io), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/rand-paul-the-civil-rights-
act.and_private_discrimination/; David Weigel, RandPaul, Tellingthe Truth, RIGHT Now (May
20, 2oo, 8:50 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/right-now/zoI0/05/rand-paultelling_
the-truth.html.
120 See Joyner, supra note 159; Weigel, supra note 119.
121 See Joyner, supra note 119; Weigel, supra note 119.
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to the jurisprudence of Justice Harlan, and this doctrine's foundational
premise of the distinction between private and public spheres.
In 1883, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.1l 1 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 marked the
zenith of Reconstruction legislative activity. The Act guaranteed that
everyone, regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, was
entitled to the same treatment in "public accommodations" (i.e. inns,
public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement). 12 3 It was the precursor to the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 had died in the House the previous year,
even after passing the Senate.2 4 President Grant publicly endorsed the
Bill in his second inaugural address.' Nonetheless, the bill only survived
in the Senate thanks to the "tireless advocacy" of an ailing Charles
Sumner.2 6 The Democratic landslide in the 43rd Congress ensured that
this would be the last time for a decade that Republicans would control
both the White House and the Congress." 7 With violence erupting in the
South again, and their party's control of the federal government about to
expire, the so-called "radical Republicans" devised a program to safeguard
what remained of Reconstruction with the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as
their centerpiece.' The bill became law only after President Grant
intervened in disputed southern elections, ordered troops to suppress an
insurrection of confederates and white supremacists in New Orleans, and
the provision mandating integrated education was removed, stricken at the
last moment." 9
Seldom enforced, it took only eight years for the Supreme Court to
overturn the Civil Rights Act of 1875.13 The Supreme Court argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment, upon which the Act had been based,
only prohibited state action in violation of its provisions, and did not
contemplate relief against "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights."'13 1
The Court feared that such a law would "establish a code of municipal law
regulative of all private rights between man and man in society." 13 The
Court continued:
122 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,4 (1883).
123 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335,336. Justice Harlan would ground this
right to "public accomodations" in both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
124 ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1877, at 226-27 (990).
I25 Id.
1z6 Id.
127 Id. at 233.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 233-34.
13o The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 (1883).
131 Id. at i i.
132 Id. at 13.
2O011-2012]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
[Clivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the constitution against state
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals,
unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or
judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual,
unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime
of that individual .... 133
Justice Harlan, inaugurating a generation of great dissents, vigorously
disagreed. m In his opinion, the Fourteenth Amendment was not simply
prohibitory in character, as the majority asserted, but was of a "distinctly
affirmative character." 135 Specifically, the citizenship clause constituted
the nation itself by defining and granting federal citizenship in affirmative
terms. This affirmative measure was enforceable under Section 5 of that
Amendment, and was not constricted by prohibitory language found in the
second sentence of Section 1.136
To highlight the unduly constricted reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment now being advanced, Harlan emphasized that Congressional
authority to guarantee the freedoms and rights enumerated within the
Reconstruction Amendments must be commensurate with its earlier power
to protect slavery.'37 Harlan observed an ironic incongruence between
the Court's broad reading of Congressional authority to protect slavery
and enforce fugitive slave laws, and the narrow reading of Congressional
authority to pass legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.38
By advancing these arguments, Justice Harlan rejected an overly
simplistic sharp public/private divide. The right of freedmen to equal
access to public accommodations, often controlled or operated by
private individuals or business, was at stake. The characterization of
such accommodations as public or private was a decisive legal question.
Justice Harlan asserted that although the owners may be private, they are
nonetheless public entities:
[R]ailroads are public highways, established, by authority of the state,
133 Id. at 17.
134 Id. at 33-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Goodwin Liu suggests that the first Justice Har-
lan, not Justice Holmes, really began the tradition of the "great dissent." See Goodwin Liu,
Remark, The First Justice Harlan, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1383, 1385 (2oo8).
135 CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. at 46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
136 For further development of this argument, see Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and
National Citizenship, 116YALE L.J. 330,334-35 (2oo6) (arguing that the Citizenship Clause and
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imbue Congress with an affirmative
font of authority).
137 Civil Rights Cases, i9 U.S. at 30 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506,526 (1858)). In Ableman, the Supreme Court upheld the Fugitive
Slave Law from a challenge by the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin, stating that "the act of
Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by
the Constitution of the United States .... Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 526.
138 Civil Rights Cases, i09 U.S. at 28-30 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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for the public use ... [even though they are] controlled and owned by
private corporations... it is a part of the function of government to make
and maintain highways for the conveyance of the public ... no matter
who is the agent, and what is the agency, the function performed is that
of the stat- that although the owners may be private companies, they may
be compelled to permit the public to use these works in the manner in
which they can be used.1 39
Mirroring the approach of his brethren fifty years later in Marsh v.
Alabama, 140 Justice Harlan adopted a functional approach to the question
of state action. Furthermore, Justice Harlan would have also argued that
a denial of public accommodations was a 'badge or incident' of slavery
violative of the Thirteenth Amendment, which lacks a state action
requirement. 141
Despite Justice Harlan's persuasive dissent in The Civil Rights Cases, a
dissent which he personally cherished even more than his most famous
dissent in Plessy,141 it was nearly a century before discrimination in public
accommodations was once again prohibited.'43 Despite the accomplished
fact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the characterization of the Fourteenth
Amendment described by the majority in The Civil Rights Cases remains
curiously intact.144 Not only is the Fourteenth Amendment an enforcement
mechanism cramped via the state action doctrine, but only one of the post-
Reconstruction opinions, Plessy, has been formally overturned. 145 Both
Slaughter-House and The Civil Rights Cases remain good law, even though
they were cut from the same cloth as Plessy.14
Subsequent cases addressing pervasive forms of private discrimination
139 Id. at 38 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Olcott v. Supervisors, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678
(1872)).
140 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 50 1, 5o6-o8 (1946). For an extended discussion of Marsh,
see supra note 353 and accompanying text.
141 See The Civil Rights Cases, 1O9 U.S. at 36-37; see also Darrell A. H. Miller, White Cartels,
The Civil Rights Act of I866, and the History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REv.
999, 1001-02 (2oo8) (examining the link between the economic argument and the statutory
arguments for antidiscrimination laws, especially through the Thirteenth Amendment).
142 Liu, supra note 134, at 1389.
143 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243.
144 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 507-09 (3d
ed. 2oo6). The precedential value of the state action doctrine has been subject to consistent
scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 8o Nw. U. L. REV. 503,
504-05 (1985); Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "StateAction, " Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (criticizing state action as a "conceptual disaster
area").
145 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483,494-95 (1954).
146 One might also include United States v. Harris in the list of cases where the Four-
teenth Amendment's application is excessively restricted by the state action doctrine. United
States v. Harris, io6 U.S. 629 (1883) (applying the state action doctrine to declare a statute,
which punished private citizens "for conspiring to deprive any one of the equal protection of
the laws enacted by the state," unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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struggled with this fundamental dichotomy. The resolution of cases like
Shelly v. Kraemer, which prohibited enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants, uncomfortably reflect the state action assumptions announced
in the Civil Rights Cases. 147 In Shelly, the Court found no defect in private
racially restrictive covenants.141 Instead, the state actor happened to be
courts, which may not enforce such covenants in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 49
As a legal doctrine, the state action doctrine is premised upon distinctive
public and private spheres. However, it may be more accurate to say that
the state action doctrine, as it was being formulated, helped constitute
the public and private spheres, generating and affirming sharp legal and
cultural distinctions out of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment within
a reactionary political environment hostile to civil rights. Rand Paul's
argument5 is a familiar one because it is reminiscent of southern white
hostility to integration and the dismantling of Jim Crow. These spheres, as
constituted by the Court, were then used to restrict and limit governmental
regulation of private behavior, especially discriminatory behavior in the
market. The eviscerated protections for racial and ethnic groups and other
groups inured to the benefit of corporations, which deploy the doctrine as a
shield against legislative activity more generally.
C. Substantive Due Process and Interstate Commerce
From the late 1880s until 1937, the Supreme Court enforced a form
of laissez-faire market fundamentalism, which severely curtailed the
power, of the federal government and states to regulate the economy for
the benefit of the public. This judicial market fundamentalism occurred
against a backdrop of public outrage over the excesses of the gilded era.
The Populist and Progressive movements had made corporate power a
major political issue. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887 were enacted to more vigorously protect the national
economy against corporate excesses. 5 '
147 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1948).
148 Id. at 13.
149 Id. at 14.
150 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
151 DONALD DEWEY, THE ANTITRUST EXPERIMENT IN AMERICA 4 (o990). Darrell A. H.
Miller persuasively argues that the Thirteenth Amendment's "power to govern private eco-
nomic relationships," as well as the experience and rhetoric of the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion politics provided a grounding and "intellectual credence" to the antitrust movement.
See Miller, supra note 141, at 999-OOO. In particular, many of the architects of the Sherman
Act were veterans of the Reconstruction era legislative battles. Senator John Sherman was a
member of the Reconstruction Congress, and Senators George Edmunds and George Frisbie
Hoar, drafters of the Antitrust Act, were as well. Id. at 1037. Miller does not* mention this, but
Senator John Sherman was the brother of the great Civil War General William Tecumseh
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The concentration of wealth through the great trusts and monopolies
of the era sparked widespread fears of corporate power corrupting state
and federal governments. The Populist leader William Jennings Bryan
endorsed a constitutional amendment making the election of U.S. Senators
occur through direct vote, a procedure designed to prevent corporations
from manipulating the appointment of Senators in state legislatures.,"
The Populists also enacted a federal income tax bill, which provided for a
two percent flat tax on corporations.153 And although a Court led by Justice
Field overturned the law in Pollack,' 4 the American people would overrule
that decision with a constitutional amendment.'55
In theory, federalism is a democratizing force. 5 6 The more authority
and control is localized, the more democratic laws may be. However,
lowering decision-making authority to the state level means, in many
instances, transferring it to corporate authority beyond the reach of private
citizens and the state.'57 This is because "even middle-sized corporations
can influence state governments and play one state's workforce off against
another's by threatening to move production elsewhere unless they get
better tax breaks and so on."' 58 With the states increasingly dominated
by corporate interests and simultaneously liberalizing corporate laws, the
Progressives turned to the federal government to reign in corporations.
The regulation of corporate power became a major issue in President
Theodore Roosevelt's administration. To more effectively investigate the
trusts, President Roosevelt created a special Bureau of Corporations.'59
This Bureau was viewed as essential to antitrust enforcement since the
Justice Department was composed of just eighteen lawyers, and the federal
government was "too small" to tackle them on an equal basis. 16° In 1905,
President Roosevelt warned Congress that:
The fortunes amassed through corporate organization are now so large,
Sherman. CHERNOW, supra note 32, at 298. It is important to mention that the Sherman Act
was largely unenforced in the early years of the Act. The law was "vague in meaning" and "so
riddled with loopholes that it was popularly derided as the Swiss Cheese Act." Id. It was not
until Teddy Roosevelt's administration that enforcement became more vigorous, including
the case lodged against Rockefeller's Standard Oil. Id. at 432, 537-42. A contemporary journal-
ist, Henry Demarest Lloyd, referred to it as "The Anti-Trades Union Law," given the fact that
it was used for union busting as much as monopoly busting in the early years. Id. at 339-40.
152 GANS & KENDALL, supra note 92, at 30-31.
153 Id. at 31.
154 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607-o8 (1895).
155 U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.
I56 NoAM CHOMSKY, UNDERSTANDING POWER: TYIE INDISPENSABLE CHOMSKY 345 (Peter R.
Mitchell & John Schoeffel eds., 2002).
157 Id.
158 Id.




and vest such power in those that wield them ... that it is useless to try to
get any adequate regulation and supervision of these great corporations
by State action. Such regulation and supervision can only be effectively
exercised by a sovereign whose jurisdiction is coextensive with the field
of work of the corporations - that is by the National Government."161
President Roosevelt and other Progressives enacted a number of federal
laws regulating corporations. Prominent among them was the Tillman
Act, which prohibited corporations from making political contributions
to candidates for federal office. 6 ' The basis for the Act was concern that
corporations should not be permitted to use their enormous wealth-and
influence to corrupt the political system.'63 Congress also created the
Federal Trade Commission and enacted a new federal corporate tax.14
While the public and the political leaders of the nation were reigning in
corporate power, the Courts were quick to reverse many of these gains.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment had been passed to protect
the rights of freed slaves, between 1890 and 1910, just nineteen cases
brought under it dealt with descendants of slaves, whereas 288 dealt With
corporations. 16 More pointedly, Justice Hugo Black noted in 1938 that of
the cases in which the Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment
since Santa Clara, "less than one-half of 1 per cent[ ] invoked in it protection
of the negro race, and more than 50 per cent[ I asked that its, benefits be
extended to corporations."'" One of the principal mechanisms for using
the Constitution to protect excessive corporate prerogative was the Due
Process Clause.
Since corporations were safely adjudged to be "persons" under the
Fourteenth Amendment in Santa Clara's progeny, it followed that they
enjoyed personhood rights provided in that provision. The Court began
to vigorously deploy the Due Process Clause to strike down labor laws,
minimum wage laws, and economic regulations. 16' From 1905 to 1935,
nearly two hundred state laws regulating prices, labor, or labor conditions
were struck down as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 168 The so-called "Substantive Due Process" doctrine was
thus a mechanism for shielding excessive corporate prerogative from the
i6I Theodore Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Fifth Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1905),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=z9546#axzzlVcSCEtZk.
i6z Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36,34 Stat. 864, 864-65; see also GANs & KEND-
ALL, supra note 92, at 33
t63 GANs & KENDALL, supra note 92, at 33.
164 Id.
165 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492-PRESENT 255
(HarperPerennial rev. & updated ed. 1995).
166 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938).
167 ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, THE CONSTITUTION IN EXILE: How THE FEDERAL GOVERN-




interference of state regulations.169
The case that symbolizes this doctrine, the use of the Due Process
Clause to curtail state authority to regulate economic activity, is Lochner
v. New York. 7' In Lochner, the Supreme Court overturned a New York law
regulating sanitary and labor conditions in bakeries, including the number
of hours a baker could work per day.17' Although Justice Holmes's dissent
is more famous, 7 ' Justice Harlan registered another notable dissenting
opinion, in which he observed that the New York statute probably "had
its origin, in part, in the belief that employers and employees in such
establishments were not upon an equal footing."'73 Justice Harlan rejected
the false formal symmetry assumed by the majority that corporations,
although legally "people," were on equal economic footing as natural
people. 74
Notably, the Court deviated briefly from the principles of Lochner in
the 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon, affirming a denial of women's rights
uhder the Fourteenth Amendment.7 5 In Muller, the Court upheld a state
law limiting factory work by women to ten hours a day.'76 While the Court
acknowledged that Lochner overturned a similar maximum hour law statute
for men, the Court nonetheless upheld the law on grounds that differences
between the sexes justified differential treatment.'77 In doing so, the
169 Id.
17o Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
171 Id. at 64.
172 See id. at 75. (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
173 Id. at 69.
174 Id.; see also Steven L. Winter, John Roberts's Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. Mi1Ai L. REv.
549,554 (2009). Winter makes this point as well, and connects this false formalism with Plessy:
Thus, in Lochner, it is the formal individual - that is, the one endowed with the
same legal rights as every other- who is free to contract as he or she sees fit regard-
less of the economic realities. So, too, in Plessy, the meaning of segregation is not
a social or cultural fact, but a matter of interpretation which individuals are free
to determine for themselves. Indeed, it is only in this formalized world of indi-
viduals abstracted from their social contexts that it is possible simultaneously to
acknowledge that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this
country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs and yet
insist that the resulting differences in white and black participation in the relevant
market is nevertheless a matter of entrepreneurial choices.
Id. at 555 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (19o 8) ("[W]ithout questioning in any respect
the decision in Lochner v. New York, we are of the opinion that it cannot be adjudged that the
act in question is in conflict with the Federal Constitution....
176 Id. at 423.
177 Id. at 42 1. The Court was persuaded that the public had an interest in the work hours
of a woman such that Oregon statute did not conflict with the United States Constitution,
because
[T]hat woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is es-
pecially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are
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Court was careful to explain that this was a narrow exception to its Lochner
doctrine, and not a breach of its principles.'78 It is ironic that the Court's
refusal to extend equal protection rights to women would prompt it to go
so far as to briefly abrogate the corporate prerogatives it had worked so
hard to fashion.'7 9 It would not be until 1971, in Reedv. Reed, that the Court
would hold that sex discrimination was violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.8 0
The Lochner doctrine was only half of a judicial formula circumscribing
governmental interference in the market. While the Court was busy striking
down state laws regulating labor and business conditions, it was also busy
blocking federal activity designed to regulate the national economy. The
Progressives relied on the Commerce Clause to enact laws aimed at abuses
of corporate pdwer. Accordingly, the Supreme Court routinely struck down
congressional legislation as exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce
Clause authority as the parallel mechanism for protecting corporate
prerogatives at the federal level.
Following the onset of the Great Depression and New Deal legislative
activity, the Court's Commerce Clause rulings became a focal point of
national attention. In the 1930s, New Deal legislation was passed to
improve the condition of workers and the economy. This was viewed in
some quarters as trampling on the rights of corporations. In a series of cases,
the Supreme Court overturned many of these laws. The Court struck down
the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1936.1l1 In A.L.A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down a portion of the
National Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional. 82 Then a year later,
in 1936, the Court struck down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935 in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 183
Although many of these decisions were generated by a deeply divided
not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time
on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon
the body, and, as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race.
Id. at 42 1, 423.
178 Id. at 423.
179 Recall that the Court was confronted with a similar situation prior to Dred Scott,
where its corporate standing doctrine threatened to open federal courts to blacks under Privi-
leges and Immunities claims. Some jurists seriously considered curtailing corporate standing
rights to ensure the exclusion of blacks. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.'
i8o Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
181 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1936) (declaring unconstitutional the Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10,48 Stat. 31).
182 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,551 (1935) (declaring
unconstitutional the National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67,48 Stat. 195 (933)).
183 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 317 (1936) (declaring unconstitutional the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-402,49 Stat. 991).
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Court, President Roosevelt proposed a measure to overcome the judicial
gridlock that would have authorized him to appoint additional Justices
to the Court, if a sitting one continued to serve six months beyond his
seventieth birthday.184 In effect, it would have allowed the President to
appoint up to six new Justices to the Court. Not coincidentally, one of the
key swing votes on the Court, Justice Owen J. Roberts, switched his vote in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, in which the Court upheld Washington State's
minimum wage law,"5 just two months after the President announced his
plan.186 Thus began the unraveling of the Lochner era.
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court declared that the
government could regulate economic activity more broadly than was
previously recognized.187 In Carolene Products, the Court upheld a federal
law regulating the contents of milk.' 8 The importance of the decision
was not simply its precedential value, but the new rule, announced by
the Court, regarding economic regulation. The Court said that economic
legislation was subject to a rational basis review, and would be upheld so
long as it was "reasonabl[e]."' 189 The case generally created a presumption
in favor of economic regulations, implicitly overruling Lochner. 190
While some might view Carolene Products as a practical response to a
dire economic reality, the full significance of the decision lies in its famous
footnote. In footnote four, Carolene Products offered a sweeping roadmap for
Constitutional jurisprudence. Cited as one of the most famous footnotes
in Constitutional history, 91 footnote four establishes tiered guidelines for
scrutinizing various types of legislative activity.19 In particular, the Court
singled out for special protection laws that seem to fall within the text of
the Bill of Rights, that restrict, political processes, or that target "discrete
and insular minorities."1 93 Footnote four is the precursor to contemporary
184 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 255-56.
185 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400. 0937).
186 Hence, this decision is often called the "switch in time that saved nine." CHEMERIN-
SKY, supra note 144, at 256; see also Parrish, 300 U.S. at 398-400 (1937).
187 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); see also infra Part I.D.
I88 Id. at 148.
189 Id. at 147.
190 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 623-625. The implications of this shift by the Court
also suggested a shift in the public/private doctrine, but this later implication remains largely
underdeveloped.
191 See, e.g., id. at 539, 624; Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Car-
olene Products Footnote, 4 6 S. TEx. L. REV. 163, 165 (2004).
192 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
193 Id.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of unde-
sirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the




Supreme Court doctrine concerning the standards of review applicable
under the Fourteenth Amendment.'94
Throughout much of our history there has been a strong linkage
between the issues of corporate prerogative, civil rights, and democratic
values. In part, this is simply because there is a strong relation between
corporate prerogatives, and the rights of workers, citizenship and civil
rights. It is the issue of racial and civil rights that is the least intuitive.
Yet, time and again, through the courts and in larger political culture, this
relationship is clear. As a vehicle for expanding and protecting the rights of
freed slaves, the Fourteenth Amendment was ultimately commandeered
to shield corporate prerogatives. In Carolene Products, the Court reversed
course on race and corporations: rolling back protections for corporations,
while acknowledging special protection should be given to "discrete and
insular minorities.' '95 This was not only a repudiation of Lochner, but of Jim
Crow (and by extension Plessy), and would provide the basis for its eventual
overthrow.
The new paradigm that appeared in footnote four of Carolene Products
was a "mirror image" of the Lochner period: "judicial deference in areas of
economic regulation and judicial protection of civil rights and liberties."' 196
To describe the magnitude of this transformation, Steven Winter compares
it to a Kuhnian paradigm shift. 9 More dramatically, Cass Sunstein refers to
it as the "Revolution of 1937." 1 Regardless, West Coast Hotel and Carolene
Products represent a jurisprudential break, and signaled a return to the
values embodied in the Reconstruction Amendments.
Today, both the Lochner era Substantive Due Process doctrine and the
narrower Commerce Clause reading have been paraded as the "Constitution
in Exile" by many contemporary legal commentators, who call for a return
to its principles.'99 In the mid-1990s, a more limited Commerce Clause
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial minorities
... : whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. (citations omitted).
194 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 540-543.
195 Id.
196 Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy andlncommensurability in ConstitutionalLaw, 78 CALIF.
L. REV. 144i, 1462 (1990) (footnote omitted).
197 Id. at 1453, 1462.
198 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 40-67 (1993).
i99 See, e.g., NAPOLITANO, supra note 167, at I I i-i6o. "During the Lochnerera, these doc-
trines were the Court's principal source of defense guarding individual rights against govern-
mental encroachment." Id. at I 1 I. Napolitano continues: "[h]opefully, the Supreme Court will
continue the recent trend initiated by Lopez, Morison, and Jones will uphold the true intent of
the Constitution." Id. at i59. The term "Constitution in Exile" was coined by Jeffery Rosen
to describe those "who believe that the Supreme Court went awry in 1937 when it began
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reading seemed poised to emerge. In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck
down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond Congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause.2 °° In Morrison v. United States, the
Court overturned the Violence Against Women Act under the Commerce
Clause as non-economic activity."' These decisions proved to be a mirage
for believers in a pre-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In
Gonzalez v. Raich, six Justices upheld enforcement of the Controlled
Substances Act, affirming that purely intrastate commerce may affect
interstate economic activity."' 2 As Jeffery Toobin put it, "[tihe pre-1995
status quo had returned." ' 3
As with the state action doctrine, the Court has at times narrowly read
the Commerce Clause to limit regulation by government and expansively
applied the Due Process Clause as mechanisms of corporate prerogative,
shielding corporations not only from federal government regulation, but
from state interference as well. Despite the persistent advocacy of the
"constitution-in-exile" advocates, and even one clear vote on the Court,"'
neither a pre-New Deal reading of the Commerce Clause nor a Lochner-
esque Substantive Due Process revival seems imminent. The legacy of
these doctrines lies in the role they played historically, imbuing federal-
state and public-private distinctions with cultural and political significance
long past their doctrinal applicability.0 '
to permit regulation of economic activity." Mark Schmitt, The Legend of the PowellMemo, AM.
PROSPECT (April 27, 2005), http://prospect.org/cs/articles?articleld=96o6. It should be noted
that while offered as a defense of natural law and individual liberty, Napolitano's book is eerily
silent with respect to the concerns that animated early American liberalism, especially those
regarding the "tyranny of the private sector" and concentrated wealthy interests.
200 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,567 (1995).
201 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000).
202 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2005).
203 JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 302
(2007).
204 Jeffrey Rosin, The Unregulated Offense, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2005, available at http://
www.nytimes.cOm/2005/04/17/magazine/i 7 CONSTITUTION.html (examining the influ-
ences of the Constitution-in-exile movement upon Justice Thomas opinions); see also Lopez,
514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I write separately to observe that our case law has
drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. In a future case, we
ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of
our more recent case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause.").
205 Laurence Tribe notes that the Slaughter-House Cases may have paved the way for the
substantive due process doctrine by "affirm[ing] the duty of the Supreme Court to safeguard
the autonomy of the federal and state governments within their respective spheres of power."
I LAURENCE H. 'TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1311 (3d ed. 2000). He goes onto say
that:
[T]he Justices of the 189o-1937 era, likewise imbued with Miller's sense of the
state and federal spheres and persuaded of the need to protect their sanctity, dis-
cerned yet a third sphere - that of the citizen, whose autonomy both required fed-
eral protection and could be defended without federal suffocation of the states....
The Court thus came to perceive a perfect complementarity between the citi-
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Although the influence of Lochner diminished by the 1970s, largely
discredited as an anachronistic byproduct of an ideological Court, creative
jurists were already searching for innovative ways to protect corporate
actors from government regulation while expanding their prerogative. 0 6
If corporations could not defend themselves from economic regulation in
the courts, perhaps another avenue would be more profitable. Given the
strict regulation of campaign financing, and rules on lobbying, how might
corporations achieve greater political influence?
D. Commercial Speech and Beyond
Following the logic of Carolene Products, the Supreme Court held that
commercial speech was undeserving of any special First Amendment
protections in Valentine v. Christensen.07 Since commercial speech was
considered economic activity, laws regulating economic activity were
subject to rational basis review.
In 1975, the Supreme Court reversed course, reviving shades of Lochner.
In that year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bigelow v. Virginia,"'8 which
pertained to advertisements for abortion services in newspapers. Writing
on behalf of the Court, Justice Powell struck down a state law that had
been used to prevent the publication of such advertisements, holding that
"speech is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because
it" is a commercial advertisement. 0 9 Just one year later, the Court handed
down Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,21 0 in which it clarified Bigelow. The Court determined, according
to Erwin Chemerinsky, "that the economic interests of the speaker
zens' right to "life, liberty, and property" and the state's authority to preserve such
life, liberty, and property through the exercise of its implied powers within settled
common law standards. This complementarity permitted the turn-of-the-century
Court to believe that the federal judiciary could protect citizen autonomy without
intruding upon the state's sphere - because any state action that invadedthe liberty
or property of its citizens was, by definition, beyond the state's sphere.
Id. at 1311-12. In a sense, Tribe sees a parallel scheme between state/federal, public/private,
and really, we might suggest, civil rights/corporate rights. See id.
2o6 This should not be perceived as simply leaving the market alone, a form of market
fundamentalism. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. As Sunstein has shown, the mar-
ket is fundamentally dependent on government and legal rules. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 198,
at 72. Many market relations are conditioned by and dependent upon the existing system of
legal rules, including property, tort, and contract law. See id.; see also BERNARD E. HARcouRT,
TkIE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKErs (201 1) (arguing that there is no such thing as a 'free market,'
in the sense that every market operates by certain rules or social norms). The question is not
whether a market should be regulated, but how. Id. At 242.
207 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
2o8 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
209 Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 384
(1973); N.Y.Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
210 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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should not matter in deciding whether speech is protected by the First
Amendment." ''1 The Court emphasized the importance of commercial
speech in a democracy that depends on the free flow of information. As
long as commercial information is not false or misleading, the Court said,
the First Amendment protects it."'2 These decisions called into question
the long-standing distinction between commercial speech and core
political speech. The implication of extending greater First Amendment
protections to corporations quickly manifested.
In the 1977 Bellotti decision, also authored by Justice Powell, the Court
held that the First Amendment protects corporate expenditures in support
or opposition to ballot initiatives."1 3 Massachusetts sought to criminalize
banks or business corporations from making contributions or expenditures
designed to influence certain ballot initiative campaigns. In overturning the
statute, Justice Powell announced the principle that "[t]he inherent worth
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual. ' ' 14
The dissenting Justices foresaw the consequences of extending
corporations the same First Amendment rights as natural persons. Then-
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, warned that "the blessings of potentially
perpetual life and limited liability. .. so beneficial in the economic sphere,
pose special dangers in the political sphere."1 s Those dangers were
expressed by Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall:
It has long been recognized however, that the special status of
corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts of
economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the
economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral process.
... The State need not permit its own creation to consume it. 16
Already, the Court's members realized that heightened protection
for commercial speech was one step removed from protecting corporate
speech in political campaigns. Although Justice Powell's majority opinion
distinguished between cases involving candidates for public office and
referenda on issues or ballot initiatives such as those at issue in Bellotti, it
was not clear that the principle he announced in support of his decision
would be easily cabined. Justice Powell asserted that the "risk of corruption
perceived in cases involving candidate elections ... simply is not present
211 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 1o85.
212 See id. at Io86.
213 See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775, 8z (1978).
214 Id. at 777.
215 Id. at 825-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting). In addition to those rights listed by Justice White,
we would also add civil and environmental rights.
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in a popular vote on a public issue." ' 7 However, more recent cases, such
as Citizens United v. FEC,18 erected on foundation constructed by Justice
Powell, have justified those dissenting concerns.
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court held that corporations'
independent expenditures on political campaigns enjoy First Amendment
protection.2 1 9 In its most recent commercial speech case, Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc.,2 0 a majority of the Court appeared to apply a stricter form
of scrutiny protective of corporate speech rights from a state patient
confidentiality law that, in the words of Justice Breyer and the other
dissenters, harkens back to the Lochner era, in which the Court regularly
substituted its own judgment for that of legislatures in matters of ordinary
economic legislation. 2 '
Justice Lewis Powell was more than the author of the Supreme Court's
1970s commercial speech decisions, he was also their architect. Powell
was a corporate lawyer from Virginia and sat on the board of eleven major
corporations.2 2 Just prior to his nomination to the Court, Powell devised
a comprehensive and farsighted strategy to expand corporate prerogative,
one that might extend corporate power into every facet of American
democracy.
Known as "The Powell Memo" or the "Powell Manifesto," Lewis
Powell's 6,000-word confidential memorandum to the Director of the
Chamber of Commerce was a blueprint for expanding corporate power.2 3
The memo begins by asserting that America's free enterprise system
is under "broad attack." ' 4 He identifies the sources of the attack, the
tone and expression of the attack, and sets about a systematic defense.
He criticizes the "apathy" of business to engage in politics and political
debate.2 ' He calls for the development of sustained political organization
by corporate elites, with specific objectives for universities and colleges,
media, scholarly research, political engagement, and most importantly, the
217 Id. at 790.
218 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
219 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896 (2oO).
220 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
221 Id. at 2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
222 The PowellMemo (also known as the PowellManifesto), RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG (Apr. 3,
2004), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate-accountability/powell-memo-lewis.html [here-
inafter Introduction to The Powell Memo].
223 Id. For a history of the memo, see KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING
OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN 156-165 (2009).
224 Memorandum from Lewis E Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman








Some have described the Powell Memorandum as the "[aittack [m]
emo [that] [c]hanged America. 22 7 Some see in its recommendations the
inspiration for the institutions and organizations that have arisen since,
such as conservative think tanks.2 8 Ultimately, it is probably accurate to
say that the memo prompted major corporate leaders, and by extension,
corporations themselves, to become more politically active.
2 9
Although the degree of influence and reach of the memo's ideas has
been contested, 30 it remains undisputed that Lewis Powell himself
possessed considerable influence over our nation and its law. Just a few
months after drafting the memo, he was nominated to the U.S. Supreme
Court by President Richard Nixon.23 1 It should come as little surprise,
therefore, that Powell identified the judiciary as an agent of change:
American business and the enterprise system have been affected as much
by the courts as by the executive and legislative branches of government.
Under our constitutional system, especially with an activist-minded
Supreme Court, the judiciary may be the most important instrument
for social, economic and political change .... Labor unions, civil rights
groups and now the public interest law firms are extremely active in the
judicial arena. Their success, often at business's expense, has not been
inconsequential.23
2
It is important to note that Justice Powell saw corporate interests as
antithetical, or at least in tension, with the interests' civil rights groups, labor
unions, and public law interests groups. This is no small matter. Powell
explicitly articulated a strategy that supporters of expanded corporate
prerogative had now employed for decades.233 The expansion of excessive
corporate prerogative is checked not only by the state, through regulation,
but also by organized labor and other public interest groups, which call
upon the apparatus of the state to enforce law and promote the public good.
As a school board member, and in fact, chairman of the Richmond School
Board from 1952 to 1961,11 Justice Powell would have been intimately
familiar with the NAACP legal strategy to dismantle segregation and the
226 Id.
227 Jerry Landay, The Powell Manifesto: How a Prominent Lawyer's Attack Memo Changed
America, MEDIA TRANSPARENCY (Aug. 20, zOOZ), http://old.mediatransparency.org/story.
php?storylD=2 I.
228 See Introduction to The Powel Memo, supra note 222.
229 See JOHN B. JUDis, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ELITES, SPECIAL INTER-
ESTS, AND THE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST 117 (2000).
230 See Schmitt, supra note 199.
231 Importantly, Powell sailed through confirmation hearings without his essay coming
into the light. See Landay, supra note 227.
232 The Powell Memo, supra note 224.
233 See Introduction to The Powel Memo, supra note 222.
234 Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 383, 438 (2000).
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efficacy of that strategy. He was also a partner at a firm that was hired by
Virginia to fight the Brown decision, although he personally took no role in
the case in that capacity. 35
Given his strategic vision, it cannot be a coincidence that Justice
Powell was so influential in expanding protection for corporate speech,
with important implications for our democracy. Justice Powell was the
instrumental author of cases that dramatically expanded corporate speech
protections.2 36 Since Carolene Products imposed rational basis review on
laws regulating economic activity, Justice Powell adopted the argument
that commercial speech was more than just economic activity. Protecting
commercial speech was one step removed from protecting corporate
political involvement, as illustrated in cases like Citizens United. This
allowed Justice Powell to undermine Carolene Products from within; to
affirm its essential premise while undermining its significance. Although
corporations may be subject to economic regulation, they could still help
elect business-friendly legislators.
While Powell was enacting his vision of corporate power, he was also
eviscerating the rights of marginalized populations under footnote four of
Carolene Products in which it was asserted that heightened review should be
reserved for legislation that disadvantages "discrete and insular minorities."
It was Powell's opinion in Bakke that upended this long established
framework:
[Pletitioner argues that the court below erred in applying strict
scrutiny to the special admissions program because white males, such
as respondent, are not a "discrete and insular minority" requiring
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. This
rationale, however, has never been invoked in our decisions as a
prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny.
Nor has this Court held that discreteness and insularity constitute
necessary preconditions to a holding that a particular classification is
invidious. These characteristics may be relevant in deciding whether or
not to add new types of classifications to the list of "suspect" categories
or whether a particular classification survives close examination. 237
In throwing out the Carolene Products approach for heightened
protection for discrete and insular minorities, Justice Powell was the first
to enact a new form of colorblindness and instantiate the anti-classification
principle as a general principle of law applicable to both invidious
discrimination and "benign," compensatory, and remedial approaches. 38 In
235 Id.; see also john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Parents Involved: The Mantle of
Brown, the Shadow of Plessy, 46 U. LouiSVILLE L. REv. 631, 700-701 (zoo8).
236 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 532 (198o); Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 558 (I98O); First Nat'l Bank of Bos.
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1977).
237 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted).
238 See Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Col-
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so doing, strict scrutiny became the applicable standard of review for all
racial classifications 39 In authoring Bakke, Powell was well aware of what
was happening with civil rights, having observed it at both the local and
national level. Given the strong link between corporate prerogative and
limited rights for people, it should not be surprising that Powell addressed
both of these areas during his tenure.
Justice Powell's memo sketched a strategic vision to reinvigorate
corporate standing and expand corporate power and influence in the United
States. He advanced a plan that would be partially implemented through
courts' 40 because, as Landay suggests, Powell knew "that changes in policy
that could not readily be achieved by legislative or bureaucratic means
might more easily be won in court." '' Following his nomination to the
Court, nearly everything he proposed has been implemented, whether by
design or not. 4 2 It is not coincidental that he undermined Carolene Products
in other ways as well. In his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell eviscerated the
court's role in protecting discrete and insular minorities: again, expanding
excessive corporate prerogative while limiting the rights of marginalized
communities. Justice Powell may not have reversed the Revolution of
1937, but he engineered an end run around it that would limit the rights of
marginalized groups and promote the expansion of corporate prerogative.
II. BEYOND PUBLIC/PRIVATE
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the condemnation of a stretch of riverfront homes
when the admitted purpose of the governmental taking was to enable
orblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1039 (2007).
239 Prior to the 1989 decision City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469
(1989), all racial classifications were not subject to strict scrutiny review. Cf. Ci-EMERINSKY,
supra note 144, at 694 n.24 and accompanying text (indicating that the Court determined that
all racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny following the Court's decisions in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), and Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
The Court distinguished between classifications that were intended to improve opportunities
for traditionally disadvantaged groups and classifications designed to harm discrete and insu-
late minorities. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980). Consequently, "benign" racial
classifications would be subject to intermediate or a lesser standard of review, while intention-
ally discriminatory classifications would be subject to strict scrutiny review. See id. In Croson,
however, a majority of the Court asserted all state-based racial classifications were subject
to strict scrutiny view. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. Furthermore, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995), the Court asserted that that this was true for federally imposed
racial classifications as well. Since then, all state-imposed racial classifications, whether by the
federal government or state and local municipalities, are subject to strict scrutiny review. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 695 n.26 and accompanying text.
240 The Powell Memo, supra note 224.
241 Landay, supra note 227.
242 See Schmitt, supra note 199.
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private redevelopment by the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer, Inc. 43 The
Fifth Amendment guarantees that "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation." 44 The Court has expansively
interpreted the public use requirement to encompass any "public
purpose."145 Ultimately, the Court held that the condemnation did not
violate the public use requirement; a public taking for private use on
behalf of a multi-national corporation constituted a "public purpose.""4
The Kelo decision illustrates the fluidity of public/private distinctions, and
the difficulty in drawing sharp lines between them in terms of either means
or ends.
Recalling Justice Harlan's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment,
47
if a government taking on behalf of a private corporation constitutes a
public purpose, why is government intervention in the market on behalf
of civil rights considered private interference, and beyond the bounds
of government authority to redress? We are not suggesting that Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence calls into question the validity of the state action
doctrine, but that something else may be at work. These domains serve
power functions, and operate to protect the prerogatives of corporations
and white space respectively. Perhaps what is involved is not public or
private, but corporate. These domains have been wrongly conflated.
Privatization is not a shift from the public sphere, meaning government,
to private individuals, but more frequently a shift from public to corporate
space. In Kelo, the Court insisted that the public nature of the taking was
maintained despite being for private corporations.
48
In this part of the article we assert that the public/private distinction
has been fundamentally misconceived. The ideology of privatization and
governmental non-interference in the economy is based on the view
that there is a clear and conceptually coherent public/private distinction.
Building on the insights of critical legal scholars, we will argue not only
that this distinction is empirically amorphous and conceptually flawed, but
also that that a very different set of domains has been constructed. Even
if there were a coherent distinction between public and private, it is our
assertion that corporations do not fall easily into either. The aggressive
assertion of corporate prerogatives is better characterized in other ways.
Such a perspective renders more clearly the threats that corporate space
poses to both public and private.
243 Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469,472-75 (2oo5). Note that this land was not blight-
ed, but valuable riverfront property. Id. at 474-75.
244 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
245 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479-80 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112,
158-64 (1896)).
246 Id. at 489-90.
247 See supra note 134-4 1 and accompanying text.
248 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486.
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A. Public/Private: A Flawed Distinction
In political theory, the public/private distinction emerged and acquired
significance during the Reformation and Enlightenment.49 The Protestant
Reformation from Luther on emphasized individual conscience and
individual - or private - moral space, based on direct communion with
God, unmediated by clerical authority."' In that respect, the Protestant
Reformation brought into politics and religion a private domain based
in part on a "private consciousness." Enlightenment thinkers sought to
insulate this domain from both intrusive political and clerical authority
with First Amendment guarantees such as freedom of religion and the
Establishment Clause. 51
These origins inform our understanding of private space today. We
associate "private" space with our home or other domains perceived to
be free from government surveillance, where there is maximal freedom,
privacy, and minimal governmental regulation.5 2 This space retains a sacred
aura. In contrast, we associate "public" space with government activity or
space where everyone is welcome. We think of public libraries, parks, roads
and waterways, and public services, such as police, fire, and educational
provisions, which are available to all citizens. Unlike the "private" space,
the "public" space is earthly and secular.
Although the public/private distinction arose earlier, it only became
central to legal thought and discourse - as distinguished from political
and theological - during the nineteenth century. This distinction became
cemented as a project of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. In fact, "[ol
ne of the central goals of nineteenth-century legal thought was to create
a clear separation between constitutional, criminal, and regulatory law -
public law - and the law of private transactions - torts, contracts, property,
and commercial law." '53 This objective emerges early in the nineteenth
century.
A landmark case that connects corporate power and inscribes the public/
private distinction is the Dartmouth College v. Woodward case of 1819.54 The
Dartmouth decision constitutionalized the tendency to define corporations
249 See powell & Menendian, supra note i9, at 105 I.
250 Id. at I040-41.
251 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..
252 See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
253 Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423,
i424 (1982).
254 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 5i8 (1819); see also supra
notes 33-59 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the Dartmouth College decision in
emancipating corporations from state control).
2011-20121
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
in terms of "dichotomous public and private spheres. 25 - Throughout
the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, many of
the bases of excessive corporate prerogative were developed through
a discourse and jurisprudence of the public/private. As we examined in
Part I, corporations were formed as quasi-public entities, and through an
ideological struggle became quasi-private. 5 6 Each of the bases of excessive
corporate prerogative surveyed in Part I is premised on the public/private
distinction. In each case, the Court is helping to generate legal categories
that depend upon and shape pre-existing cultural categories. The public/
private distinction becomes a major project of nineteenth-century law
because it resolves difficult and thorny legal issues in ways that expand
corporate prerogative while shielding private discrimination from state
regulation.
By generating legal rules that depend upon this distinction, the question
of whether activity is public or private is an issue of great importance.
Private activity or behavior under current jurisprudence generally does not
trigger constitutional protection."5 7 Elaborate doctrines have developed to
determine whether something is "state action" or not. s8 In contrast, public
255 Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law, 64
TEx. L. REV. 225, 240 (1985) (reviewing HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
POWER: IIE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW (1983)). Not only was
this the effect of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion on behalf of the Court, but the concurring
opinion of Justice Story does so even more pointedly:
Another division of corporations is into public and private. Public corporations
are generally esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only, such as
towns, cities, parishes and counties; and I many respects, they are so, although
they involve some private interests; but strictly speaking, public corporations are
such only as are founded by the government, for public purposes, where the whole
interests belong also to the government. If, therefore, the foundation be private,
though under the charter of the government, the corporation is private, however
extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the
founder, or the nature and objects of the institution. For instance, a bank created
by the government for its own uses, whose stock is exclusively owned by the gov-
ernment, is, in the strictest sense, public corporation. So, an [sic] hospital created
and endowed by the government for general charity. But a bank, whose stock is
owned by private persons, is a private corporation, although it is erected by the
government, and its objects and operations partake of a public nature. The same
doctrine may be affirmed of insurance, canal, bridge and turnpike companies. In all
these cases, the uses may, in a certain sense, be called public, but the corporations
are private; as much so, indeed, as if the franchises were vested in a single person.
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 668-69 (18i9) (Story, J., concurring).
256 See supra Part I.A.
257 The Thirteenth Amendment is the notable exception. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII;
see also supra note 141 and accompanying text (describing the application of the Thirteenth
Amendment).
258 These doctrines originate in the Civil Rights Cases. See Part I.B. "[Firom the time of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment until the present, it has been the consistent rul-
ing of this Court that the action of the States to which the Amendment has reference, includes
action of state courts and state judicial officials." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 18 (1948)
(holding that the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants by the state judicial officers is
state action). For an elaboration of theories applying to "hard cases" - public function theory
and nexus theory, see Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action for an Age of Privatization, 45 SRAs-
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actors pursuing matters in the course of their official duties sometimes enjoy
immunity or qualified immunity from prosecution. 5 9 Public defendants,
whether persons or institutions, are subject to statutes, rules, regulations
and codes of conduct that do not apply to private defendants." °
The relevant legal categories fashioned and applied by the Court
constrain the range of possible outcomes.2 6' Because the Court operates
from a precedential methodology, prior case law "will have already
demarcated the arguments and counterarguments" that will be recognized
as persuasive.26 Cases such as Dartmouth College were, in one sense, decided
at the epistemic level rather than on the basis of a legal rule.163 If Dartmouth
was determined to be a private institution, then the New Hampshire
legislature's attempt to replace the trustees violated the Contract Clause.
But if Dartmouth was a public institution, then the legislature's efforts
were valid. Similarly, if a law passed under the Fourteenth Amendment
targets private conduct and not state action, then it may be held invalid. In
that respect, these cases depend in some measure on pre-existing, extra-
legal or cultural meanings.
At the same time, these legal determinations in turn reinforce or have
the power to change cultural meanings that affect political discourse, as
we saw from the ways in which the Dartmouth College decision influenced
the debates over the Second Bank of the United States.z64 Justice Harlan's
jurisprudence not only rejects a sharp public/private distinction in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, he reconfigures the meaning of
citizenship in robust terms that have long since evaporated in the wake
of Slaughter-House and The Civil Rights Cases. 6s Had his constitutional
understanding prevailed, the salience of the public/private distinction as a
decisive legal category would be greatly diminished.
While we find Justice Harlan's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and his expansive Constitutional vision persuasive, there
is a deeper issue at stake. While one cannot deny that the public/private
distinction is a meaningful legal distinction, there is a separate question
of whether it is a coherent legal distinction. Some scholars complain that
this dichotomy has "lost its ability to distinguish." 66 Even Chief Justice
CUSE L. REV. 1169, 1174-83 (1995),.
259 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-420 (1976) (discussing the Court's
qualified immunity jurisprudence).
26o Id.
z61 SeeWinter, supra note 196, at 1452, 1475-76.
262 Id. at 1453.
263 See id. at 1452.
264 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Harlan's dissent in
the CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,26 (1883)).
266 Paul M. Schoenhard, A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinction,
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Warren, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, wrote that "the distinctions between
governmental and private sectors are [increasingly] blurred." '67
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
the Supreme Court struck down two voluntary integration plans in Seattle,
Washington and Louisville, Kentucky. 68 These plans employed a variety
of assignment mechanisms to ensure that no school was racially imbalanced
within a wide range, usually plus or minus fifteen percent of the district as a
whole. These plans were intended not only to sustain the hard won gains of
integration, but also to ensure that no student was racially isolated, despite
patterns of residential segregation. Over the past few decades, and most
visibly in Milliken v. Bradley, the courts have drawn a distinction between
state sponsored segregation, 69 the sort found in the Brown cases, and de
facto segregation that is described by Justice Thomas as the "result... of
innocent private decisions." 7 0
Although Justice Kennedy voted to strike down the plans at issue, he
upheld the legal principle that promoting racial diversity and ameliorating
the harms of racial isolation were compelling governmental interests. In
doing so Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that government may
only remedy dejure segregation in seeking to achieve the elusive objective
of equal educational opportunity. He said that "[t]he distinction between
government and private action, furthermore, can be amorphous both as a
historical matter and as a matter of present-day finding of fact. Laws arise
from a culture andvice versa. Neither can assign to the other all responsibility
for persisting injustices." ''
We agree. A generation earlier, Justice Powell went even further. Justice
Powell rejected the de jure/de facto distinction as one that "no longer
can be justified on a principled basis." 72 In his view, "[plublic schools
are creatures of the State, and whether the segregation is state-created
2oo8 UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (2OO8).
267 Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)
268 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709-10 (2007).
269 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721-22, 752-53 (1974).
270 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
271 Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added). Justice Kennedy, repeating the holding of Croson, insisted that the school districts
effort in Parents Invoked failed to structure its student assignment plan in a way that would
survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 783-84, 787. As discussed earlier, this approach is traced back to
footnote four of Carolene Products. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text. The position
adopted by Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved is distinct from Justice Powell's position in
Bakke, which radically changed the meaning of footnote four. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293 (1978) (Powell, J.) (stating that the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment should not be applied to one specific racial minority because "the United States
had become a Nation of minorities"); see also supra note 237 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Justice Powell's misapplication of Carolene Products' footnote four).




or state-assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to
constitutional principle." '73 Justice Powell developed this view in light of
his long experience as a school board member.2 7 4
In Rand Paul's view, 75 the "intent of the [Civil Rights Act] was to
stop discrimination in the public sphere and halt the abhorrent practice
of segregation and Jim Crow laws."2' 76 The Civil Rights Act, however, was
not simply targeting state sponsored behavior. The reason for this is the
reason that Justice Kennedy articulated in Parents Involved. Jim Crow laws
and the public segregation and discrimination embodied in them were a
manifestation of the values of the society, of the extant social norms and
mores, and the individuals within it. Those values were also present in
the' north, except that northern segregation was more a matter of practice
and custom than state legislation. Without question, the Civil Rights Act
targeted laws, but it also targeted the more general practices, values, norms,
and prejudices from which those institutional forms of discrimination
were an expression. It encompassed the North, not simply the South. To
suggest otherwise is to misunderstand not only the intended scope of the
Act, but the cultural significance of it as well. Rand Paul and others rewrite
history by suggesting that the Civil Rights Acts were merely targeting
the institutionalized expression of these values. Although it was passed
in part, under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fair Housing
Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968),'77 which explicitly targets
private housing discrimination, belies this point.
There is perhaps no better example of the hydraulic relationship
between culture and law than the infamous Dred Scott decision.7 ' Chief
Justice Taney held that persons of African descent were not-and could
never be---citizens of the United States because white folks, not simply
white governments, regarded them as inferior. 7 9 It was the way in which
white people in their private pursuits regarded black folk, notsimply how
273 Id. at 227 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
274 See powell & Menendian, supra note 235, at 700 n.328.
275 Much of the subsequent criticism of Rand Paul's view of the Civil Rights Act that oc-
curs between notes 275 and 288 is directly quoted from an essay by the co-author. Quotation
marks and indications of alteration have been omitted for purposes of clarity and readability.
Citations are made to the original sources. Stephen Menendian, Why Libertarians (and Rand
Paul) Are Wrong About the Civil Rights Aa, HUFFPOST POLITICS (May 27, 2010, 9:44 AM),http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-menendian/why-libertarians-and-rand-b-591682.html.
Further citations to this source are omitted for purposes of readability. Cf. Joyner, supra note
1 19; and Weigel, supra note 119.
276 Stephanie Condon, Rand Paul I Support the Civil Rights Act, POLITICAL HOTSHEET
(May 25, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/83o1-5o3544-z62-20005512-503544.
html.
277 Civil Rights Act of 1968 §§ 804-805,42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3605 (2006).
278 Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. 393 (i856).
279 Id. at 404-05.
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states and white governments regarded them that proved legally decisive:
[Persons of African descent had for more than a century before been
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate
with the white race, either in socialorpolitical relations; and so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and
that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of
merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This
opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilizedportion of the white
race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no
one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men
in every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon it
in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without
doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.2 10
Because blacks were regarded as inferior, both in "morals as well as in
politics," Chief Justice Taney reasoned that they could not possibly have
been part of the political community that formed the nation, and therefore
could not be full and equal citizens of that nation."8 ' It was the prejudices
of white people, not the discrimination and prejudices of the states, which
ultimately led the Chief Justice to inscribe a race line into the heart of
American citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction
Amendment that underpins the Civil Rights Acts, was passed specifically
for the purpose of overturning Chief Justice Taney's legal holding."' 2 It
did precisely that, first and foremost, by extending the status of national
citizenship to all persons born or naturalized here, not simply white
persons." 3 And it was passed over the objection of President Johnson, who
vetoed the precursor Civil Rights Act of 1866 precisely because he believed
it went too far, reaching beyond state action and into private conduct, and
was therefore constitutionally objectionable.2z 4 In fact, the Fourteenth
Amendment was passed to override such objections, and put them to rest
forever.
The distinction that Rand Paul is making between public and private
discrimination, between state-sponsored segregation like Jim Crow and
private exclusion, is both seductive and false. Not only are laws a product
of private values, but laws also shape and influence private attitudes. A
history of race in North America makes clear that racial attitudes and racial
prejudices were, in large measure, a product of colonial laws, such as colonial
28o Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
281 -Id.
282 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74 (1872).
283 Id.; see also supra note 86.
284 Veto Message from Andrew Johnson, President of the U.S., to the Senate of the U.S.,
(Mar. 27, 1866) in 6 JAmEs D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, § 2: ANDREW JOHNSON, APRIL 15, 1865- MARCH 4, j869, at 72-80 (1902), available
at http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/gutbookllookup?num= 12755. His veto mes-
sage in style and substance foreshadows both the states' rights and state action doctrines as
mechanisms of white racial prerogative.
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anti-miscegenation statutes, which accelerated the understanding of racial
difference. 8 In fact, colonial elites (the colonies were not democracies)
passed the first anti-miscegenation law in 1662, and did so. specifically
to keep the races apart as a way of racializing and color-coding labor, a
process instrumental to the development and promotion of racial prejudice
that would accompany and come to justify full blown racial slavery.286 As
Steve Martinot points out, if there had been "general antipathy to mixed
marriage, its occurrence would have been minimal, requiring little or
no official prohibition." '87 As a result, these colonial statutes, and others
serving similar ends, were a precondition to the full development of a racial
worldview, and the racial prejudice that it engendered. In other words, these
public acts were designed to promote private prejudices, and succeeded in
accomplishing that end.
Private attitudes and private market decisions are often a product
of or influenced by state action, and state action is often a product of or
influenced by private attitudes and private conduct. Private actions and
inactions have public consequences and vice versa. 8 To take one example,
the Court has recognized the ways in which public inaction can perpetuate
private discrimination. In Crosan v. City of Richmond, Justice O'Connor
affirmed the idea that local governments may take action to redress private
discrimination occurring within their jurisdictions, 9 Moreover, she went
on to say that cities and localities need not sit by idly if they become a
"passive participant" in a system of exclusion." °
The relationship between public and private is neither clearly
demarcated nor easily confined in its immediate consequences. The error
of the Dartmouth College decision was not simply deciding that Dartmouth
was a private institute (which it clearly was not, at least, not exclusively),
285 STEVE MARTINOT, Th E RULE OF RACIALIZATION: CLASS, IDENTITY, GOVERNANCE 54-57
(2003). There is often described a chicken-or-egg quality to slavery and racial prejudice.
Whichever came first, they clearly supported each other.
z86 Id. at 56-57.
287 Id. at 55.
288 See Richard Stengel, One Document, Under Siege, TIME, July 4, 2011, at 30, 40 ("But
what happens when that healthy, young uninsured woman goes skiing and tears her anterior
cruciate ligament and has to have emergency surgery? She can't afford to pay the full fee, and
the hospital absorbs much of the cost. That's basically a tax on everyone who does have health
insurance, and it ultimately raises the cost of hospital care and insurance premiums.... [D]
oing nothing can be a private decision with public consequences..").
289 City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosan Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989) ("It would seem
equally clear, however, that a state or local subdivision (if delegated the authority from the
State) has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legisla-
tive jurisdiction.").
290 Id. at 492 ("[I1f the city could show that it had essentially become a'passive partici-
pant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry,
we think it clear that the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.").
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but the failure to recognize its public features. 91 As Judge Henry Friendly
put it, "[tihe error of the Marshall court lay in assuming a complete
dichotomy between public and private; it failed to realize that what seems
to be a private corporation may be public as well." 9 Broadly speaking, the
Dartmouth decision instantiated a shift in the political culture that would
reverberate throughout the nineteenth century, from the debate over the
Bank of the United States through the Reconstruction period.2 93The public/
private distinction acquired critical legal significance, and the impulse
to sort actors, institutions, and functions into one of these dichotomous
categories was validated - obscuring the dynamic relationship across each
domain. 94 Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in the Civil Rights Cases
underscores this point. 295 It is not simply that the Civil Rights Acts and the
Reconstruction Amendments target both private and public conduct, and
that the distinction between the two should not be a determiniative basis
for legislative or judicial reasoning, but that the private market and state
action is not as neatly divisible as we currently presume.
There is a complex and dynamic relationship between public and
private institutions, and public and private actors. 96 Neither the identity
of the actor, the source of funding, nor the function of the activity can
serve as a sole criterion for delineating the question of whether the actor,
institution, or function is public or private. 97
In our political culture, it is typical to think of housing as a largely private
good. Yet, consider the government actions that both precondition and
promote homeownership. As a result of the Selective Service Readjustment
Act (the G.I. Bill), 98 more Americans were able to buy a home rather than
rent, for the first time in United States history.2 99 It did so by capping
interest rates, waiving down payments, and providing a thirty-year loan.300
Consequently, between 1945 and 1954, 13 million new homes were built in
291 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
292 FRIENDLY, supra note 50, at 10.
293 See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 26o-65 and accompanying text.
295 For a discussion of Justice Harlan's dissent in the CivilRights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,33-62
(1883), see supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
296 Beyond the origins of the public-private distinction, we find many ways in which
this distinction bleeds or is not nearly as clear as one might think.
297 See Barak-Erez, supra note 258, at 1191-92 (1995) (arguing that inadequate protec-
tion of constitutional rights may result from a more limited recognition of state function be-
cause of the shift of state services into the hands of private entities).
298 Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 [hereinaf-
ter the G.I. Bill].
299 See George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of Affirmative Action in Housing: The




the United States.3 10 From 1946 to 1947, Veterans Administration mortgages
comprised more than forty percent of the total mortgages on the market.
30 2
Federal policy enabled broad homeownership.
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,303 signed by President
Eisenhower on June 29, 1956, launched the construction of the interstate
highway system, the largest public works project up to that point in
American history.3°4 As President Eisenhower later recounted:
More than any single action by the government since the end
of the war, this one would change the face of America .... Its
impact on the American economy - the jobs it would produce
in manufacturing and construction, the rural areas it would
open up - was beyond calculation.0 5
The expansion of credit and transportation networks facilitated the
creation of suburbs, and drove many upper- and middle-class families to
abandon the central cities in favor of suburban life.3°6 At the same time, it
meant many new developments and increasing private homeownership.
The Federal Housing Administration and the G.I. Bill each played a vital
role in this process.30 7
Private housing markets, private developments, and private modes of
transportation may all appear to be market decisions, but they are equally
the product of public policy decisions.3 °8 This may seem obvious in the case
of transportation decisions that favor the construction of roads and highways
over the development of public transit networks, but it is no less the case
for private housing markets and even private developments. Even though
Fair Housing Authority's (FHA) underwriting manuals no longer contain
racist language, FHA policy has continued to influence the development
of private space.309 For example, in 1964, the FHA recommended a
development plan promoting the control of recreation centers and parks
by private homeowner associations.310 This recommendation arrived just as
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374.
304 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, 1953-1956, at 548 (1963).
305 Id. at 548-49.
306 See Chad D. Emerson, AllSprawled Out: How the Federal Regulatory System Has Driven
Unsustainable Growth, 75 TENN. L. REV. 411, 421-22 (2008).
307 See Swan, supra note 299, at 135, 155, 197; see also GEORGE LipsiTz, How RACISM
TAKES PLACE 27-28 (201 1).
308 See LipstTz, supra note 307, at 31.
309 See Lips'rlz, supra note 307, at 31,34.
310 Id. at 31. It is no coincidence that this occurred "at the peak of the civil rights move-
ment's mobilizations." Id. As this article highlights, as public space becomes more inclusive, it
is deliberately shrunk to accommodate previously impermissible separation. Relatedly, there
is a trend of public incorporation but private separation, and the rhetoric of privatization is
deployed to justify these arrangements. The civil rights movement, for this reason, aimed at
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public space was being desegregated.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the biggest players in the secondary
mortgage market, buying, pooling, and securitizing mortgages to increase
the supply of money available for mortgage lending and increase the money
available for new home purchases. 311 Consequently, both entities set much
of the standards for the entire mortgage market.3"' Both companies were
government chartered, but became private corporations in 1968 and 1970,
and were subsequently traded on the NYSE. 313 Massive losses in recent
years and fears of instability in the housing market prompted the federal
government to put both companies under "conservatorship" in 2008 and to
infuse them with capital from the Treasury Department. 314 As much as 90-
95% of the mortgage market is directly or indirectly affected by the activity
of these two government-sponsored, but not controlled, enterprises. 315
They provide liquidity into the market, making it possible to buy and sell
mortgages more efficiently, and their practices help structure the market
itself. Even when these were private corporations, the line between private
and public was blurry at best.
More generally, we are now confronted with an array of complex
public-private relations that make categorization even more perilous
and the distinction less certain or useful as a meaningful legal category.3 16
Although privatization is typically understood as dissolving public space
or government withdrawal from an area or activity, in practice privatization
typically involves delegation of public functions or delivery of government
services by private actors, producing a hybrid public-private authority of
both public and private incorporation. Orlando Patterson, Equality, DEMOCRACY, Winter 2009,
at 13, available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/i i/Patterson.pdf. Rand Paul's opposi-
tion to private integration illustrates the limits of their success.
311 See Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and Control
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REv. 1489, 1505-08.
312 See id. at 1509-12 (demonstrating how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "had helped
to create the modern mortgage market system of secondary purchases of loans, which were
pooled, securitized and sold as investments").
313 Quintin Johnstone, Private Mortgage Insurance, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 827
(2004).
314 Janice Kay McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Federal De-
regulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-up Call for Reforming Executive Compensation, 1 2
U. PA. J. Bus. L. 131, 149 (2009).
315 Symposium, Regulatory Reform and the Future of the U.S. Financial System: An Examina-
tion of the Dodd-Frank Regulation: Panel 3: The Future of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, 7 N.Y.U. J.
L. & Bus. 53 1, 538 (zo I.
3 16 Paul M. Schoenhard, A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinction,
zoo8 UTAH L. REv. 635, 642-43 (2oo8); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation,
103 COLtM. L. REV. 1367, 1376-94 (2003) (examining four notable examples of privatization -
Medicare and Medicaid, welfare programs, public education, and prisons - to demonstrate the
contemporary trend towards greater privatization and how it impacts government programs,




In fact, this distinction actually makes it increasingly difficult to devise
and implement policy solutions to current problems. 318 Industrial policy
is anathema because it implies a command and control economy, but the
reality has always been that the public and private sectors have come
together in important ways to stimulate economic growth. 3 19 From the
beginning of the country to the intercontinental railroad to the industrial
expansion during World War II, the United States has always fostered
strategic relationships between public and private sectors. 311 Some argue
that massive United States investment in infrastructure, science and
technology, state universities, and infant industries, from 1950-1980,
317 See Metzger, supra note 3 16, at 1395.
3t8 Instead, we tend to cling to the fiction that there is a clean distinction between state
action and private action, ignoring the ways in which private and public are hopelessly inter-
connected. Matt Taibbi makes the point:
Parson's entire theory of the economy is the same simple idea that Bachmann and
all the other Tea Partiers believe in: that the economy is self-correcting, provided
that commerce and government are fully separated. The fact that this is objec-
tively impossible, that the private economy is now and always will be hopelessly
interconnected not only with mountains of domestic regulations... but with the
regulations of other countries is totally lost on the Tea Parry, which still wants to
believe in the pure capitalist ideal.
MArT TAIBBI, GRIFrOPA: BUBBLE MACHINES, VAMPIRE SQUIDS, AND THE LONG CON THAT Is
BREAKING AMERICA 16 (2010). There is another argument, advanced by scholars such as Cass
Sunstein, which illustrates how private transactions are indirectly regulated by the state and,
therefore, are not entirely "private." See SUNSTEIN, supra note 198. For example, employment
relations or agreements to provide goods or services cannot be thought of as wholly "private,"
since they are conditioned by and dependent upon the existing system of legal rules, includ-
ing property, tort, and contract law. See id. at 7 t-75; see also HARCOURT, supra note zo6.
319 Germany provides one such example. See Rana Foroohar, Don't Hold Your Breath,
TIME, June 20, 2011, at 26 ("The lesson of Germany is a good one. Back in 2000, the Germans
were facing an economic rebalancing not unlike what the U.S. is experiencing. East and West
Germany had unified, creating a huge wealth gap and high unemployment at a time when
German jobs were moving to central Europe. The country didn't try to explain away the prob-
lem in quarterly blips but rather stared it directly in the face. CEOs sat down with labor lead-
ers as partners; union reps sit on management boards in Germany. The government offered
firms temporary subsidies to forestall outsourcing. Corporate leaders worked with educators
to churn out a labor force with the right skills. It worked. Today Germany has not only higher
levels of growth but also lower levels of unemployment than it did prerecession.").
320 The most important thought here is that the idea that government and private busi-
ness are totally separate or can be kept hermetically sealed from each other is false. One of
Ron Paul's responses to the CNN Live Republican Debate indicates he holds a contrary
opinion. Transcript of CNN Live Republican Debate, supra note 2 ("There shouldn't be
any government assistance to private enterprise. It's not morally correct, it's [il]legal, it's bad
economics."). The point is that government and private enterprise have always had a symbi-
otic relationship. The existence of railroads, roads, canals and shipping lanes, not to mention
other forms of infrastructure, are the basis for private business developments. One could not
develop and sell the automobile without a network of roads for them to operate. Similarly, In-
ternet and communications businesses require infrastructure already running into consumers'
homes. Paul and others posit a wholly separate existence, which is contrary to factual reality.
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"triggered [the] two generations of economic growth" that have made the
United States the leader in the "world of technology and innovation.""3
The public/private divide, as a conceptual category and a popular
heuristic, creates a blind spot and inhibits the development of economic
solutions that do not rely solely on either private sector growth or fiscal
stimulus, but rather on a coordinated and targeted policy.32 ' In fact, the
fastest growing economies in the world do not take a sharp public/private
view, but understand that "strategic actions by the government can act as
catalysts for free-market growth."3 3
The 1960s Civil Rights Acts were targeted at racial discrimination
broadly, both at the racist attitudes and private discrimnation that continues
to negatively affect so many in our society, and at the legislation that
embodied those attitudes. What Rand Paul sees as government overreach
and interference in private markets is nothing less than a moral imperative
to ensure a fair and just society, to guarantee that no one is denied a job, a
promotion or other opportunities to succeed in life because of their race,
sex, religion, familial status, or disability. The distinction Paul relies on
may not exist or may be far more permeable than he thinks. The sharp
public/private distinction, both as a heuristic and a legal principle, obscures
the thoroughly dynamic relationship between private conduct and public
responsibility. Many functions in society shift from what is thought of
public to private and back. In the contemporary political culture, the move
is often in the direction of public to private. While Paul insists he supports
civil rights, he would limit their reach in favor of a notion of an expanding
"private" space that is fact corporate.3 4
B. Non-Public/Non-Private Space
The central argument of this article is that excessive corporate
prerogatives have been smuggled through and masked by a discourse of
public/private. The public/private distinction is both a sword and shield.
It is a source of corporate prerogatives and a defense against government
interference and regulation. The public/private distinction further masks
these prerogatives as natural and individual rights. The arguments for
deregulation and governmental non-interference are framed as a defense
321 Fareed Zakaria, The GOP's Abstract Professors, IME, June 27, 20 1 , at 23.
322 See Tamara Lothian & Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Crisis, Slump, Superstition and
Recovery: Thinking and Acting Beyond Vulgar Keynesianism 20-24 (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Stud-
ies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 394, 201 1), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1780454 (outlining an example of a coordinated program for economic recovery).
323 Zakaria, supra note 32 1, at 23 ("From Singapore to South Korea to Germany to Can-
ada, evidence abounds that some strategic actions by the government can act as catalysts for
free-market growth.").
324 For a discussion of private/corporate spaces, see infra Part II.B.
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of individual liberty and personal freedom.3 25
The underlying structure of our claim, including the critique of the
public/private distinction, is hardly novel. Feminists and critical legal
scholars have long recognized the lack of conceptually clear dichotomous
public/private spheres.32 6 Moreover, they are attentive to the work
such categories perform. Feminists have long argued that the private/
public dichotomy is a gendered dichotomy, masking and insulating male
privileges.3"7 They assert that the private is political and, further, that private
space is no less socially and legally constructed than public space.3"' From
this perspective, the public/private dichotomy is less an analytical tool than
a heuristic device or political rhetoric for making value choices. 3 9 While we
agree with this critical insight, we go further, and posit the construction of
very different conceptual spaces.
Recall the formulation of public and private space articulated in Part
II.A.330 Implicit in the agitation of first wave feminists and abolitionists
325 See NAPOLITANO, supra note 167, at 239-41 (arguing that federal interference and
overregulation have "sent [our Constitution] into exile").
326 BRYSON, supra note 117, at 35, 230. Critical legal scholars, led by Duncan Kennedy,
developed a strong critique in the early I98os. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1350-57 (1982) (using the public/private
distinction to illustrate the stages of decline of the liberal distinctions as they "pass[] from
robust good health to utter decrepitude" and arguing that the public/private distinction can
no longer be taken seriously as a description, explanation, or justification of anything); Henry
J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra - Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982).
See also supra note 144 and accompanying text (outlining the scholarly criticism of the "state
action" trigger for applying the Fourteenth Amendment).
327 RICHARD COLLIER, MASCULINITY, LAW AND THE FAMILY 61-62 (1995).
328 See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 124-25 (1989) ("[Tjhe
personal sphere of sexuality, of housework, of child care and family life is political."); see also
supra note 318. See pp. 124-133 for the development of four critiques of the public/private
distinction. Okin also notes that: "[thc public and the domestic are in many ways not distinct
at all. The perception of a sharp dichotomy between them depends on the view of society
from a traditional male perspective. Id. at 133.
329 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
330 See supra Part II.A. This idea of privacy is not just a cultural notion, but a legal one as
well. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of hap-
piness .... They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.") Justice Brandeis' posi-
tion became law in 1967 when Olmstead was overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
352-362 (1967). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, Justice
Douglas wrote for the Court in striking down a Connecticut statute that made the use of con-
traceptives a criminal offense as an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married
persons, providing the following:
IS]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibi-
tion against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the
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was the inherently political nature of private arrangements.33 ' For women,
"private" space was hardly so. Upon marriage, the common law essentially
denied women standing rights. 332 Her property became her husband's. In
the home, women were often dominated by men, and even considered
his property, including her body. 33 3 Although the situation was starker for
slaves, it was no less the case that as "private property" slaves were subject
to abuse, rape, humiliation, and reprisal from owners, with virtually no
recourse to courts. 334 Neither the plantation nor the home was a space of
privacy or liberty for women or slaves. The state may not have played an
active role, but these spaces were not free from surveillance or regulation.
Feminists and abolitionists sought to illuminate the immorality of those
arrangements, and to mobilize popular opinion against them.
3 5
Public space is a place of power for citizens, yet women and slaves
were denied access to the public square. Women could not vote, serve on
juries, or be elected as representatives in the legislature.33 6 Women enjoyed
neither public freedom nor private freedom. In many respects, they were
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amend-
ment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of priva-
cy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boydv. United States
as protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life." We recently referred in Mapp v. Ohio to the Fourth
Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right
carefully and particularly reserved to the people."
We have had many controversies over these penumbral rights of "privacy
and repose." These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for
recognition here is a legitimate one.
Id. at 484-85 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
331 See OKIN, supra note 328, at 124-25 ("[Mlany of those who fought in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries for suffrage and for the abolition of the oppressive legal status
of wives were well aware of the connections between women's political and personal domina-
tions by men.").
332 Id. at 129.
333 Id. at 129-30 (notes that very few states recognized marital rape).
334 Scott W. Howe, Slavery As Punishment: Original Public Aeaning, Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment, andthe Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 Aiz. L. REV. 983, 1006-07 (2009).
335 See BRYSON, supra note 117, at 38-40. To the extent that the non-public or private
sphere is defined as beyond the bounds of the public interest, the task of the abolitionists and
feminists was to highlight, and thereby politicize, the private or non-public. One of the ways
in which feminists have articulated this position is to suggest that "the 'separate' liberal worlds
of private and public are actually interrelated, connected by a patriarchal structure." BRYSON,
supra note 117, at 175.
336 JOEL OLSON, THE ABOLITION OF WHITE DEMOCRACY 54 (zoo4) (discussing the legal
practice of "coverture," imported from English common law, under which a woman's civ-
ic identity was transferred to her husband at marriage, resulting in her husband effectively
"becom[ing] a surrogate for the state" in the woman's legal life); see also Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393, 42 1-22 (1857).
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considered property under law, although unlike slaves they were also
nominal citizens.337 Similarly, slaves were not permitted in the public space,
nor was there a place where they could claim privacy rights or liberties free
from the master's surveillance. 38 Slaves were barred from even testifying in
many states. 339 They had limited standing rights and virtually no recourse
for private wrongs.3 ° Their life experience was neither public nor private: it
was non-public/non-private. In a sense, the DredScot decision, and others,
constituted this space in racial terms by deciding that persons of African
descent inhabited this space and were denied public standing.
The idea of non-public space is archaic and precedes the
conceptualization of private space defined by individual and moral
features.34 1 Despite the incorporation of women and freed slaves into
the political sphere and the concomitant expansion of standing rights to
secure private liberties, we suggest that non-public/non-private space
continues to exist as a place inhabited by groups that are excluded from
or marginalized within public space and which enjoy limited or minimal
access to private space. Today, many marginalized groups, including racial
minorities living in concentrated poverty, undocumented immigrants, the
incarcerated, and the formerly incarcerated inhabit this space.M2
Public space is a sphere of power for citizens in a republic. But for non-
citizens, such as immigrants or those denied the full rights of citizenship,
it is a space of marginalization and vulnerability. Immigrants and felons
are denied, in many respects, public voice or the ability to participate in
337 See Scott, 60 U.S. at 422 ("[A] person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the com-
munity who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power....
Women and minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote; and when a property
qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those who have not the necessary
qualification cannot vote or hold the office, yet they are citizens."). One author says that "[w]
hite women in the nineteenth century endured a form of 'civil death' in which they legally
disappeared into the private realm while 'covered' by the husband or other male surrogate in
the public." OLSON, supra note 336, at 55. Importantly, however, we suggest that the "private"
realm was not really private for these women.
338 See OLSON, supra note 336, at 55 ("Black persons, whether female or male, free or
slave, were anticitizens. Marked by slavery, they were the antithesis of freedom and as such
stood outside of citizenship rather than being incorporated into it, even in a dependent or
derivative fashion.... Slavery... was a form of 'social death' in which the person disappears
as a social being from the community altogether." (emphasis added)).
339 See Howe, supra note 334, at joo6.
340 See id. at lOO6-07.
341 See PAUL BARRY CLARKE, DEEP CITIZENSHIP 82 (1996) (essentially arguing that the
public/non-public distinction did not become public/private until the full development of the
individual moral space emerged).
342 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (examining current prejudice against incarcerated
and formerly incarcerated persons); THE EXCLUDED WORKERS CONGRESS, http://www.




public affairs. These groups also lack private space, because they may
be heavily regulated and surveilled, exposing these groups to possible
exploitation. Prisoners not only lack a public voice, their incarceration
entails confinement to an environment with minimal public visibility or
privacy. They are subject to personal abuse from other prisoners or prison
personnel with limited immediate recourse.3 43 Immigrants are not only
excluded from the public sphere, but their privacy is constantly under
threat.344 Legal immigrants are subject to surveillance and even public
stops.3 45 Undocumented immigrants enjoy virtually no privacy rights, 34 6
and are subject to private exploitation from employers who would threaten
to report them.347
Before the Americans with Disabilities Act,34 8 many developmentally
disabled Americans also inhabited non-public/non-private space. Disabled
Americans may have been permitted to vote or protect their rights in court,
but they may not have enjoyed these rights as a practical matter.34 ' The
purpose of the Americans with Disabilities Act and one of the purposes
of the Help America Vote Act was to secure these rights in practice.
311
Pervasive inaccessible housing, restaurants, or even movie theatres subject
disabled Americans to limited dignity and privacy rights in public settings
due to their conspicuity. The forms of help and assistance they require in
daily living may also limit the privacy of disabled Americans. Similarly, the
homeless live in public spaces, but enjoy neither the rights of the public,
nor the freedom of private space. In many cases, they were taken out of
institutions, and consigned to public spaces out of necessity. It makes for an
343 Metzger, supra note 316, at 1393-94. This remains even more so the case for private
prisons which "are not generally subject to open government laws or other measures designed
to prevent and expose government malfeasance." Id. at 1393 n.8o.
344 Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and "Aliens": Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids,
41 U.C. DAvis L. REV. io81, 1O85-87 (2oo8). The infamous Arizona anti-immigrant bill 1070
would legalize racial profiling by requiring officers to stop any person if there is a 'reasonable
suspicion' that they may be an undocumented immigrant. [cite]
345 Seeid. at lO87-88.
346 See id. at 1o85-87.
347 See, e.g., Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1103, 1120-24 (2009).
348 Americans with Disabilities Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1o4 Stat. 328.
349 The paradigmatic example of a person's practical inability to exercise a right is a
disabled person who is not able to cast their vote because the polls are located on the third
floor of a historic nineteenth century courthouse that is not handicap accessible. Although the
person has the right to vote, as a practical matter, it cannot be exercised.
350 Americans with Disabilities Act of 199o § 2(a)(5),42 U.S.C. § izloi(a)(5) (2oo6) ("[I]
ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including
... the discrimination effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers.");
Help America Vote Act of 2002 § i o(b)(i)(G), 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (b)(l)(G) (2006) ("A State
shall use the funds [to] ... [i]mprov[e] the accessibility and quantity of polling places, includ-
ing providing physical access for individuals with disabilities.").
[Vol. IOO
EXCESSIVE CORPORATE PREROGATIVE
unsettling case where, if the homeless cannot urinate in public, they cannot
urinate.3"' The lack of adequate access to public or private space results in
a denial of personhood and humanity. .3s2
Rather than simply public/private spheres, we suggest that there are in
fact four domains that have been erected in law and practice: public, private,
non-public/non-private, and corporate. The public/private dichotomy, as a
sharp categorical distinction, is not only false in the mind, but false in the
world. The critical question is not how to define these categories, or make
sense of them, but to understand the function of these domains.353 This
dichotomy inadequately explains the power relationships that exist within
and between the two spheres. At best, these domains are heuristics, whose
meaning changes from context to context and over time. Moreover, the
Court has played a critical role in constructing these domains. By rendering
these domains decisive legal issues, the scope and demarcation of these
spheres became a significant legal question. However, the uncomfortable
attempt to define behavior or institutions in dichotomous terms obscures
other critical dynamics between public and private.
~ Spheres
C. Corporate Space
The history of corporate individualism and the doctrine of corporate
personhood is critical phenomenon, but it is not a question of public or
private. The expansion of excessive corporate prerogative - corporate space
- should not be confused with private space. Yet, this conflation is common.
In Part I, we surveyed the bases of corporate prerogative, each of which
emerged through a public/private discourse. The public/private distinction
has served to enlarge corporate prerogatives, although corporations fell
uneasily into either category. Recall that corporations were quasi-public,
then quasi-private, and now enjoy individual rights.
To refer to corporate behavior as "private" is misleading, and suggests
a narrative that corporations are people, just like us. The growth and
size of the modern multi-national corporations is without precedent
351 See, e.g., Sarah Dooling, Ecological Gentification: A Research Agenda Exploring Justice in
the City, 33 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL REs. 621, 629 (2009).
352 SeeMASsEYsupra note Io, at 13.
353 See OKIN, supra note 328, at i i O-i i (arguing that shared male-centric understanding,
even if gender neutral, can effectuate gender discrimination).
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for nongovernmental entities in human history, and cannot possibly
be understood in the same vein as small "mom and pop" corner stores.
This is the error of the Lochner era. The jurisprudence of the Lochner era
portrays a false symmetry between actors, since "private" includes both
the employing corporations and the potential employee, and all non-
governmental entities. As we will further demonstrate in this section,
corporate space often operates at the expense of private and public space.
The expansion of corporations as an institutional form raises serious
questions regarding individual rights and privileges on corporate property.
In Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court struggled with the question of
individual rights in a company town.354 Consider the context of a commercial
shopping mall. 355 We may think of that space as public space, but it is
not. First Amendment rights are limited, and there is virtually no right to
organize or petition.31 6 Union organizers and picketers or protesters have
limited rights to assemble on commercial property.357 Nor do individuals
enjoy expansive privacy rights. Commercial businesses are free to surveil,
search, and monitor individuals on private property.
Corporate behavior may inhibit individual freedom and private space
in other ways. Major corporations collect more data and information on
individual consumers than ever before. Major companies like Google not
only gather and store information on user behavior and interests, they
manipulate this information into targeted advertisements on behalf of third
parties.35 Google's street view project, in which it photographed residences
and businesses on every major street, raised serious privacy concerns,
especially regarding the use of stored information.35 9 These concerns
are pervasive in a cyber world. The Supreme Court case, Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., concerned data-mining practices by pharmaceutical companies
collecting medical patient information of specific doctor practice groups.360
354 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5o, 5o8-1o (1946). In Marsh, the Supreme Court upheld
First Amendment rights of private individuals on private property. Id. at 509. The company,
the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, owned all of the property in the suburban town, includ-
ing the streets, houses, and stores. Id. at 502-03. Justice Black, writing on behalf of a majority,
said that the property rights of the corporation could not override the speech liberties of the
residents in facilities in a company town performing a public function. Id. at 5o9-Io.
355 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). In Hudgens, the Court reversed direction
(not coincidentally), holding that union picketers did not enjoy First Amendment rights and
free speech protections in a private mall. Id. at 520.
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 See Privacy Policy, GOOoLE (Oct. 20, 2011), www.google.com/privacy/privacy-policy.
html.
359 See generally Debadyuti Banerjee, "Is My Laptop a Viable Tool to Invade Your Privacy?"
- Such and Other Critical Legal Issues Generated By Google Earth, 5 J. INT'L CoM. L. & TECH. 260
(zoo).
360 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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The data had implications for pharmaceutical marketing campaigns.3 61
These cases and other controversies illustrate the mounting privacy
concerns in high tech contexts. It should not be surprising that a divided
Court struck down a Vermont law that was designed to protect the privacy
of patients by prohibiting pharmaceutical manufacturers from selling this
data.3 6 The Court determined that the statute violated the pharmaceutical
manufacturers' corporate speech rights.
3 63
The expansion of corporate space is a threat to both private and
public space. Inhabiting corporate space is similar to residing in non-
public/non-private space. Corporations are free to surveil people in this
space, and there are limited opportunities to organize against them, as
the cases restricting union organizing efforts and picketing actiyities
demonstrate.364 Private space is conceived largely as being free from the
coercive, concentrated power of the state. Yet, what replaces the state in
corporate space is the coercive, concentrated power of the corporation. It is
not simply corporate property or speech rights that raise privacy concerns
and infringe on individual liberties, the ideology of privatization serves to
enlarge corporate space at the expense of private space while purporting to
do otherwise. The ideology of privatization is ostensibly a shift of public
space into private space, but its primary effect is to expand corporate space.
The expansion of corporate space shrinks both public and private space,
and it has profound racial and democratic implications. At the same time,
corporate space may expand non-public/non-private space and engender
the further marginalization of groups that inhabit this space.
Why is private space idealized over public? The anxiety over public/
private is rooted in the question of who counts as part of the public. When
the city of St. Louis announced plans to desegregate the public swimming
pool in 1949, hundreds of whites appeared to keep blacks out.3 65 Police had
limited success at maintaining order, and the city was eventually forced to
close its pool entirely.366 Similar patterns occurred across the South .during
the period of massive resistance.3 67 In the immediate Reconstruction
period, President Johnson opposed the Freedman's Bureau and other
land redistribution proposals as government largesse. 368 Meanwhile the
361 Id. at z661.
362 Id. at 2659, 2672.
363 Id. at 2663-64, 2672.
364 See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
365 LwPsITZ, supra note 307, at 26.
366 Id.
367 See, e.g., john a. powell and Stephen Menendian, Little Rock andthe Legacy of DredScot,
52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1153, 1179 (2oo8) ("Rather than integrate, many Southern school boards
shuttered up. Public pools closed. Public space shrank.").
368 John M. Bickers, The Power to Do What Manifestly Must Be Done: Congress, the Freedmen's
Bureau, and Constitutional Imagination, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 7o, 87-88,97 (2oo6).
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Republican Party attempted to enact legislation that would redistribute of
southern landholdings to freedmen was met with significant opposition.369
In Bell v. Maryland, Justice Ginsburg noted that public accommodations
were always "public" until after the Civil War."' As public space becomes
more inclusive, it becomes more contested. To bring in blacks, Latinos,
women, or other prior-excluded classes, ultimately constrains white male
prerogative, but also excessive corporate prerogative. Before the Civil
War, there was little doubt that public law encompassed private actions.
Individuals were held responsible and liable for violating fugitive slave
laws.37' After the Civil War, the public/private distinction was erected to
shield and protect private discrimination.37
This remains the case today. Both the devolution of authority from
federal or state to local governments and the shift of control from public
to private hands are used to expand corporate prerogative, but they
also define the nation's racial geography.37 3 Both hostile privatism and
defensive localism operate today to shield the prerogatives of white space
and dominate discussions over public policy and investment.7 4 Just as
feminists drew attention to the underlying power structure that defined
and connected both the public and private worlds, the ways in which
corporate power affects all four spheres should be highlighted, and the
corporate sphere should not be mistaken for the private sphere. Similarly,
just as the feminists and abolitionists agitated for state intervention into
the "private" world of the family and the plantation, the state has a role
in the corporate sphere because of the power relationships that permeate
it. Indeed, the Court recognized this in Marsh v. Alabama, in abrogating
absolute rights of property against the speech rights of citizens.
The ideology of privatization rests on the belief that "the public sphere
encompasses too much of American life." '375 While there are many concerns
369 Id. at 95-97.
370 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,303-04 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
371 LipsITZ, supra note 307, at 46.
372 See Part lI.B.
373 LipsiTz, supra note 307, at 87-90.
374 See id. at 28-29 ("The white spatial imaginary deploys contract law and deed re-
strictions to channel amenities and advantages to places designated as white. It makes the
augmentation and concentration of private wealth the central purpose of public association. It
promotes policies that produce sprawl, waste resources, and generate enormous social costs in
order to enable some property owners to become wealthier than others. It produces a society
saturated with hostile privatism and defensive localism through secret subsidies for exclusive
and homogeneous housing developments premised on promoting the security and profitabil-
ity of private property regardless of the larger social costs to society.").
375 Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law, 64
TEX. L. REV. 225, 225 (1985) (reviewing HENDRICK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICA LAW (1983)). The idea that
the private sector can accomplish public functions better is well represented in candidate
Gingrich's remarks about the NASA program. See supra note 7.
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that underpin this belief, including the anxiety over shared public provision
and the classical liberal concern over centralized political authority,
advocates of privatization often highlight governmental inefficiencies or
a lack of "innovation" and productivity compared to the private sector as
reasons to privatize governmental entities, property or services. Historically,
economies of scale have provided a powerful incentive for expanded
government provision, as has a larger view of the role of government,
especially with respect to education and public safety.
Consequently, over the course of our nation's history, many services and
institutions have become a part of the "public sphere." Fire departments
were traditionally volunteer services or even private services rather than an
instrument of the state.376 It was not until the Common Schools movement
of, the latter part of the nineteenth century that primary and secondary
education became a public good.377 Even more recently, entitlements such
as social security and Medicare mark the movement of old-age insurance
and other forms of social supports as "public.''
At the same time that there has been an expansion of what counts
as "public" over the course of our nation's history, there have been
countervailing forces. Today, there is a widely held view that public
space is problematic: that perhaps too much is in the public sphere, and
not enough in the private.378 It is supposed that we can solve problems
by privatizing, and improve public services at greater cost efficiency. The
charter school movement has, in some measure, become a movement to
divest public schools of their resources, often in the hopes of improving
student performance.379 Prisons are being privatized at a growing rate,
in the sense that they are being operated, serviced, and run by private
corporations.38 Even military services have been and are being contracted
to companies like Blackwater (now XeServices), infamous for their many
abuses.38" ' Notably, the Bush administration advanced a proposal that would
376 Annelise Graebner Anderson, The Development of Municipal Fire Departments in the
United States, 3 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 331, 335-37 (1979).
377 Carl E Kaestle, Victory of the Common School Movement: A Turning Point in American
Educational History (Apr. 3, 2oo8), http://www.america.gov/st/educ-english/2oo8/April/2oo8o
42321250 ieaifaso.8516I33.html.
378 See supra notes 365-72 for examples that indicate the problems with "public space."
379 See Richard Corliss, Waiting for 'Superman': Are Teachers the Problem?, TIME (Sept. 29,
20o0), http://www.time.com/timelarts/article/o,8599,2o2195 i,oo.html (detailing the attack on
teachers unions, which are blamed for poor student performance by keeping bad teachers in
schools). The publicly founded voucher plans were upheld in Zelman against an Establish-
ment Clause challenge. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002).
380 See Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, III. A Tale of Two Systems: Cost,
Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, I 15 HARv. L. REV. 1868, 1868-70 (2002).
38 1 Oversight Panel Chronicles Alleged Blackwater Abuses, CBS NEWS (June 26, 2009, 5: 14




have partially privatized Social Security. 82
Conceptually, privatization is a transfer of ownership over property
or service delivery from the state or other governmental entity to private
individuals. In practice, privatization often effectuates a transfer from one
major institution to another.3 83 When we imagine a privatization scheme,
we may think we are turning over control of a government service or
entity to actual people. Because of the legal fiction that corporations are
people, we are in many cases turning over public property, function, or
responsibilities to enormous institutions. The extreme version of this is the
privatization of state monopolies such as those that occurred following the
collapse of the Soviet Union.3 4 The state controlled monopolies, largely
intact, were simply transferred to private owners, who became national
oligarchs.385 While less extreme, similar examples abound. The Governor of
Ohio, John Kasich, has recently introduced a state budget proposal which
includes a plan to sell five prisons to private corporations.386 A proposal in
Ohio would privatize the Ohio Lottery.87 The budget bill called for turning
over the state lottery to a private company, to manage the $2.5 billion daily
operation. 88
The privatization of public entities or the delegation of vital
governmental services is more than a mere shift in categories of domains
- public to private - it is a shift in power. The re-conceptualization of
these domains helps illustrate these shifts. As a heuristic, the public/
private dichotomy fails to capture these shifts in power, which are better
represented as a shift from public to corporate. Privatization is, in many
cases, an expansion of corporate prerogative. In our vernacular, privatization
may count as "corporatization." And, as we suggested in the previous
section, the expansion of the corporate sphere entails risks for the public,
private, and non-public/non-private.
As the corporate sphere expands through privatization, the space for
people in terms of accountability and privacy shrinks.389 The data collection
382 Metzgersupra note 316, at 1369 n.I.
383 Cf. Metzger, supra note 316, at 1403, 1404,1417, 1436-37 (explaining that the practice
of handing over government programs to private entities may "place these programs outside
the ambit of constitutional constraints," or, in the alternative, may result in a public-private
partnership that "minimizes the difficulty in enforcing constitutional obligations").
384 WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31979, RussiA's ACCESSION TO THE
WTO 7 (2008).
385 Id.
386 CHRISTINE LINK ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO, PRISONS FOR PROFIT: A
LOOK AT PRISON PRIVATIZATION I (2011).
387 Mark Naymik, Ohio Senate Budget Bill Includes Lobbyist Legislation on Privatizing Ohio
Lottery, CLEVELAND.COM (June 2, 2011, 7:59 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/naymik/index.
ssf/2oI i/o6/ohio-senate_budgetbill_includ.html.
388 Id.
389 See Metzger, supra note 316, at 14oo-o6.
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and sale of personal information may raise privacy concerns, but the
disappearance of state actors calls into question the issue of accountability.
3 1
As Gillian Metzger warns, "the move to greater government privatization
poses a serious threat to the principle of constitutional accountability.' '391
What is at stake is more than public accountability, but threats to the
private sphere as well. Consider the secondary mortgage market. From
the New Deal onward, the federal government has been an active and
important participant in the housing market. The National Housing Act of
1934 created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), whose purpose
was to subsidize the mortgage market by insuring mortgages issued by
private lenders.3 9 Before the FHA, buying a home was not attainable
to most Americans. Typically, a mortgage loan would have a term of 3-5
years, and 50% down payments were required.3 93 By insuring private loans,
the FHA encouraged strapped banks to begin lending again, and greatly
expanded the market for family homes by making homes more affordable
to potential homeowners.
As discussed above, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were chartered by
the federal government during the New Deal to create liquidity in the
mortgage market and increase the money available for new home purchases
by buying mortgages from originating lenders.3" In 2009 and 2010, as much
as ninety percent of the mortgages created that year were guaranteed by
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae.39 They were privatized in 1968
and 1970, and were subsequently traded on the NYSE.3" Massive losses
in recent years and fears of instability in the housing market prompted
the federal government to put both companies under "conservatorship" in
2008, and were given an infusion of capital by the Treasury Department.
3 97
In February of 2011, the Obama administration submitted a proposal
to Congress that would wind down both companies. 398 They would shift
390 See id. at 14o4-o8 (explaining the difficulty of applying constitutional obligations to
private entities); see also Barak-Erez, supra note 258, at 1172-83.
391 Metzger, supra note 316, at 1400.
392 National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 1, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
393 Marsha Courchane et al., Industry Changes in the Marketfor Mortgage Loans, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 1143, 1149 (2009).
394 Seesupra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
395 See The Future ofFannie Mae& Freddie Mac, 7 N.YU.J. L. & Bus. 531, 538 (2o1).
396 Courchane et al., supra note 393, at 1150.
397 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 11o-289, 122 Stat.
2654; see How Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Were Saved, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 17, 2oo9), http://
www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/o9/fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac-saved.
asp#axzz i XeJVucsM.
398 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Obama Administration Plan Provides Path
Forward for Reforming America's Housing Finance Market, Winding down Fannie Mae and




the responsibility for credit in the mortgage market to private markets,
particularly four major banks that control seventy percent of the market: JP
Morgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo.399 The impact will
be tremendous. The entire housing market as we know it would change. It
would potentially make it much more difficult to get a loan, and increase,
dramatically, the cost of credit for the entire industry. That is why the
national realtors association, among others, has come out strongly against
the proposal.
Fannie and Freddie bring us full circle to Santa Clara.40 Recall that the
respondents were railway corporations, and the named respondent was the
Southern Pacific Railroad."° These companies were contesting the taxation
of fences on their routes as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.4"' Just
as Congress chartered the government-sponsored enterprises, Congress
incorporated these railroads by statute to serve as a "safe and speedy
transportation of mails, troops, munitions of war, and public stores," and
a "liberal grant of public lands was made to it." 3 Then, privatized, they
became the most powerful corporations in America until the great trusts of
the early twentieth century. These companies, just like Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, were created for public purposes, and were subsidized and
sponsored by government. In our discourse, we have for too long operated
within a simplistic discourse of public/private - ostensibly categorically
distinct - with relative values assigned to each depending on one's political
orientation. In our view, this simplistic bifurcation obscures critical power
dynamics. Just as the shrinking of public space served a power function
to protect Jim Crow arrangements, the expansion of corporate space
poses special dangers for the other three spheres. We must recognize that
corporate space is not private.
III. REVISITINGhE ROLE OF CORPORATIONS
When CNN anchor John King asked the Republican Presidential
candidates about the respective role of the federal and state government,
and the role of government in general, he elicited a scornful response. 4°4
Candidate after candidate found fault with government activity designed
to improve economic conditions, protect the environment, or even the
399 Panelists Work to Establish Future of Mortgage Market, HouSTON AGENT (June 22,
zoi i), http://houstonagentmagazine.com/panelists-work-to-establish-future-of-mortgage-
market/.
400 Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
401 Id. at 394.
402 Id. at 397-98.
403 Id. at 398.
404 CNN Live Republican Debate, supra note 2.
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well-being of citizens,4 5 preferring to let the private sector address the
respective issues.406 They negatively described governmental regulations
and programs as hampering the private sector, reducing growth and killing
jobs.4 7 They repeatedly emphasized that the role of the government
should be to promote private sector growth.
40 8
Given the skepticism regarding the role of government, John King
could have asked a logically sequential question: what, then, is the role of
the private sector? This question would have bordered on the absurd given
the prevailing assumption that government activity is illegitimate, while
private sector activity is legitimate. Yet, it would have exposed the tacit
assumptions regarding why a presumption in favor of private sector activity
exists.
Mitt Romney articulated what he felt was the crux of the issue by
explaining that "I think fundamentally there are some people - and most of
them are Democrats, but not all - who really believe that the government
knows how to do things better than the private sector.... And they happen
to be wrong."409 While expressing an opinion about the relative competence
or efficiency of government versus the private sector, Romney's answer not
only conflates the private and corporate spheres, 10 it does not answer the
broader question as to what purpose the private sector, especially industries
dominated by mammoth corporations, serves. While it may be conceded
that many government functions could be more efficiently produced by the
private sector, it does not resolve the question of whether such functions
are appropriately served by private corporations. It is not clear that efficiency
- or even superior performance - is an important or even relevant criterion
for assigning responsibility for particular functions. 4 I For example, no
405 See id. As Time put it: "Cain wants to privatize Social Security; Gingrich wants to
privatize NASA; most seem willing to voucherize Medicare along Congressman Paul Ryan's
lines." Joe Klein, Outsiders vs. Insiders: The Struggle for the GOP's Soul, TIME (June 16, 2o1),
http://www.time.com/time/printout/o,8816,2077962,oo.html.
406 CNNLive Republican Debate, supra note 2; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
407 CNN Live Republican Debate, supra note 2 (showing that Michele Bachmann stated
that "[the Environmental Protection Agency] should really be renamed the job-killing orga-
nization of America").
408 Id. Herman Cain used the "engine" metaphor, suggesting that the government
should provide the fuel. Id.
409 Id.
410 Id. Also, his apparent support of federalism is not in line with either federalism, as
between states, the federal government, and citizen, or conservatism. As we have shown in
this article, the founders were largely resistant to corporations and certainly the notion that
they are private. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
411 One might credit Romney's answer as a quintessential business perspective, where
the only relevant criteria are price, efficiency, and performance. That perspective is too nar-
row. Democratic government is not formed because it is efficient or high performing. In fact,
one might argue that Chinese style government or monarchy is a more cost "efficient" form of
government, from a pure financial perspective. Democracy is costly and messy. Our elections
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candidate seemed to suggest that military defense should be privatized.41
Possible answers to this question are not difficult to imagine. The
private sector is, for the most part, an engine of economic growth, and
serves the economy and the nation by creating jobs, promoting prosperity
and generating wealth. Additionally, it may be supposed by limiting
the scope and size of the government and enlarging the private sector,
individual liberty is maximized and that, this too, is an end worth serving.
By failing to ask the obvious, further inquiry into whether the private
sector is in fact serving these goals has been precluded. It cannot be denied
that private business is the most important employer of American workers,
the source of entrepreneurial innovation, and catalyst for improvement in
American standards of living.413 However, it is far from clear that these goals
are automatically or best served by limiting the role of government and
minimizing the intrusion of government in the market place.
There is mounting evidence that the success and profitability of
American firms does not necessarily translate into more American jobs
or improved wages and living standards. In the last quarter of 2010,
American firms generated $1.68 trillion in profits.414 American "companies
make plenty of money; they just don't spend it on workers here. ' ' 41 1 In
particular, companies that do business in global markets contribute "almost
nothing to American job growth. 41 6 From 1990 to 2008, the companies that
are testament to this, often to our national embarrassment.
412 As TIME pointed out, Romney's comments "raised the possibility that Romney might
want to privatize the military." Klein, supra note 405. Another government function that typi-
cally is discussed in the context of privatization is education. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Public
Schools: Make Them Private, BRIEFING PAPERS (Cato Institute, 1995), available at http://www.
cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-o23.html. Although it is theoretically possible that for-profit corpora-
tions could provide a superior job of inculcating certain skills, part of the purpose of education
is to prepare students for civic life in a democracy. Courts, including the Supreme Court,
have long recognized this fact. "[Education] is the foundation of good citizenship." Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). To the extent that the inculcation of civic values and
democratic ideals are central to the educational mission, this is a function particularly suited
for government, not private individuals or businesses.
413 See Chad Moutray, Looking Ahead: Opportunities and Challenges for Entrepreneurship and
SmallBusiness Owners, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 763, 77 9 (2OO9). This is especially true of small
businesses. Id. Most new jobs are created by small and medium sized companies. Id.
414 Rana Foroohar, What U.S. Economic Recovery? Five Destructive Myths, TIME (June 8,
2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/o,8599,2076568,oo.html#ixzzl PIQZNnPF.
415 Id. To get a sense of how cash flush many major corporations are, consider the
recent report that Apple has more cash on hand than the United States government. Brandon
Griggs, Apple Now Has More Cash than the U.S. Government, CNN (July 29, zoii), http://articles.
cnn.cOm/201 I-07-29/tech/apple.cash.government-i-ceo-jobs-apple-cash-balance?_
s=PM:TECH ("According to the latest statement from the U.S. Treasury, the government had
an operating cash balance Wednesday of $73.8 billion. That's still a lot of money, but it's less
than what Steve Jobs has lying around. Tech juggernaut Apple had a whopping $76.2 billion
in cash and marketable securities at the end of June, according to its last earnings report.").
416 Foroohar, supra note 414.
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conducted business in global markets, particularly manufacturers, banks,
exporters, and financial services and energy firms did not meaningfully
contribute to job growth.417 In contrast, companies that are largely confined
to the US market or are immune to global competition (such as retailers
and hotels) were the primary sources of job growth in the last decade.418
Unfortunately, employees in these sectors are lower paid and lower skilled
than those that were outsourced to labor cheap countries.419 Our largest
companies are cash flush but are not investing in American workers when
those jobs can be easily outsourced to cheaper labor markets or invested
in plant and production overseas. 40 It has not just been the case that labor,
production, assembly, and even customer support, have been outsourced
to much cheaper markets . 4 1' Corporations use the threat of outsourcing to
achieve greater and greater tax benefits and labor concessions, including
the slow destruction of organized private labor itself.422
The prototypical twentieth-centuryAmerican Corporation, as described
by the classic Berle and Means analysis, was a corporation that tended




[M]any firms would think twice before putting their next factory or R&D center in
the U.S. when they could put it in Brazil, China or India. These emerging-market
nations are churning out 70 million new middle-class workers and consumers ev-
ery year. That's one reason unemployment is high and wages are constrained here
at home. This was true well before the recession and even before Obama arrived
in office. From 2ooo to 2007, the U.S. saw its weakest period of job creation since
the Great Depression.
Id.
420 Id. Gerald E Davis refers to this as "Nikefication." Gerald E Davis, The Twilight of the
BerleandMeans Corporation.34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1131 (2OI I).
421 ANDREW L. BARLOW, BETWEEN FEAR AND HOPE 63 (2003). "Americans seeking techni-
cal support from Microsoft have their questions answered by information technology service
providers in the Philippines; consumer services for a host of TNCs are provided by Indian
women, mainly in Bangalore." Id.
422 See Michael J. Zimmer, Unions & The Great Recession: Is Transnationalism the Answer?,
I5 EMP. RTs. & EMP. PoL' J. 123, 143-44 (2o1t). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
union membership rate in the private sector workforce has fallen from 7.2 percent in 2009 to
6.9 percent in 2010. U.S. BUREAU oF'LABOR STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERS - 2010, at 1, 7 tbl.3
(2oiI), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/unionz.pdf. The union membership
rate for the decade is the lowest since the 1930s. See Gerald Friedman, Labor Unions in the Unit-
edStates, EH.NET (Feb. 1, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/friedman.unions.
us. In addition, as of 2010, twenty-two states have so-called "right to work" laws that make
it more difficult to organize workers into unions. Richard Vedder, Right-to-Work Laws: Liberty,
Prosperity, and Quality of Life, 30 CATO J. 171, 172 (2oIo), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
journal/cj3onI/cj3oni-9.pdf. The greater bargaining power by corporations depresses work-
ers' wages throughout the entire society. Zimmer, supra, at 127.
423 Davis, supra note 42o, at 1131. For the classic analysis, see generally ADOLF A. BERLE,
JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, 'ThE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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generation ago, most of our largest corporations were vertically integrated .42 4
The same corporation controlled the procurement of materials and parts,
design, manufacturing, distribution and, sometimes, retail sale of goods.
This no longer appears to be the case.
In contrast to the Berle and Means Corporation, the twenty-first century
corporation outsources a substantial amount of the assembly and supply-
chain management to overseas contractors. 45 The manufacturing, assembly,
and distribution of goods are contracted to other companies, often in East
Asia. 416 Only the "knowledge-based work of design and marketing" and
similar high value-added endeavors are actually "done by the company
that owns the brand. ' '4 7 The impact on the American labor market of the
maturing forces of globalization has been profound. In 1970, the twenty-
five largest corporations employed 9.3 percent of the American private
labor force. In 2000, that number had fallen to 4.0 percent, by more than
half.4 8 The largest corporations employ relatively fewer Americans than
they once did.4 9 In fact, in the 1990s, Fortune 500 companies erased more
jobs than they created, 430 a trend that has continued though the 2000s. This
is illustrated by the fact that Kroger, a major grocery chain, employs 334,000
workers in the United States - more than Apple (with 34,300 employees),
Google (19,835), Intel (79,800), Amazon.com (24,300), Cisco (65,550), and
Microsoft (93,000) combined. 43 1 In fact, Kroger employs over five times as
many workers in the United States as Apple employs worldwide. And yet,
companies like Apple, which employ a tiny portion of the American labor
force, are considered our leading companies.
In 2010, Apple surpassed Microsoft as the most valuable American tech
company, and second only to Exxon Mobil. 43 In 2011, Apple surpassed
Google's as America's number one brand,4 33 and briefly surpassed Exxon
424 Davis, supra note 42o, at 1133.
425 Id. at 1131.
426 Id.
427 Id. As previously noted, Davis refers to this trend as "Nikefication." The Nike mod-
el, which has already taken root in apparel, swept through the electronics industry and is now
standard practice in other industries. Id.
428 Id.
429 Nike is a company "with over $i9 billion in revenues, a market capitalization of $42
billion, and 700 retail outlets. Yet it employs only 34,400 people globally." Id. at 1132.
430 Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Corporate Welfare, TIME, Nov. 9, 1998, at 36.
431 Davis, supra note 42o, at 1136.
432 Miguel Helft & Ashlee Vance, Apple Is No. i in Tech, Overtaking Microsoft, N.Y. TMES,
May 27, 201o, at Bi ("Wall Street valued Apple at $222.12 billion and Microsoft at $219.18
billion. The only American company valued higher is Exxon Mobil, with a market capitaliza-
tion of $278.64 billion.").
433 Steve Petrovich, Apple Knocks off Google as No.j Brand, BUSINESsNEws EXPRESS




as America's most valuable company.43 As the case of Apple illustrates,
these companies, which may hire relatively few American workers, can
be quite large in terms of revenues and market capitalization. 435 In fact,
these companies may be among the most cash rich institutions on the
planet. A recent report indicated that Apple has more cash on hand than
the United States Government. 4 6 However, they are hoarding cash,
437
waiting for a better time to invest, or investing in R&D and production in
other countries. Long gone are the days of GM and Ford, large vertically
integrated companies, responsible for creating so many American jobs. 438
This data is not offered as a critique of American corporations. These
corporations are simply fulfilling their purpose to maximize shareholder
value, at which they are succeeding wildly. The outsourcing of production,
supply, and distribution also allows these companies to produce their
product as cheaply as possible, which generates value for American
consumers. This is partially accomplished by producing goods where labor
costs are minimized. But it does raise serious questions about the role of
the private sector, and our largest corporations, in terms of job creation and
improving standards of living, and the efficacy of public policies targeting
major corporations as critical employers, especially those that provide tax
breaks or subsidies. 439 Tax breaks, subsidies, credits, and other loans, grants
and economic incentives offered by state and local governments to attract
or retain major corporate employers may not only cost far more than they are
worth, but have little to no effect on long-term employment. 440 The larger
question is the following: should the purpose of our largest corporations be
to maximize shareholder value or to serve some other goal?441
To put the role of corporations in our democracy in relief and provide a
critical perpsective, consider the insights of John Rawls, one of the eminent
philosophers of the twentieth-century. In examining the merits of various
social systems, Rawls distinguished between welfare-state capitalism and
property owning democracy.44 Both systems are private property regimes,
434 Barbara Ortutay, Apple Is Most Valuable US Company, For a Bit, MSNBC, (Aug. 9,
201i, 5:38 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44o78696/ns/business-us-business/t/apple-
most-valuable-us-company-bit/
435 Davis, supra note 42o, at 1132.
436 See supra note 415.
437 Rana Foroohar, Stuck in the Middle, TIME, Aug. 4, 2011, at 26 ("The economy is weak,
and the private sector is still hoarding its cash.").
438 Please note that we are referring to large, for-profit companies. There are other legal
business forms, such as employee owned and full-fledged cooperatives that are more demo-
cratic in their structure and can be more "public" in terms of transparency.
439 Such policies are premised on a conflation of the private and corporate spheres.
44o Laura Karmatz et al., States at War, TIME, Nov. 9, 1998, at 40.
441 Recall Adam Smith's concern about accountability. See supra notes 2 1-25 and ac-
companying text.
442 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 12, at 136-4o. Rawls sets out five different
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and permit private ownership of the means of production, a feature of
Rawls first principle of justice.443 In each system, the emphasis is different.
Under welfare state capitalism, the emphasis is capital. "[T]he aim is
that none should fall below a decent minimum standard of life," 444 and
this goal is met by the provision of basic needs.44 Yet certain background
inequalities in wealth and income are acceptable, and participation in
the political culture is not a given or even a necessity. In fact, this regime
would permit the control of the economy and political life in the hands of
a few.446 While this regime has some concern for equality of opportunity,
this is largely a token gesture, and policies designed to guarantee it are not
pursued. 447
In contrast, a property-owning democracy's focus is to realize in society
cooperation between citizens is regarded as fair and equal. To do this, the
institutions of society must serve citizens, and not only a privileged few.
The background institutions of a property-owning democracy operate
to disperse the ownership of wealth and capital, in order to prevent
the concentration of both economic and, indirectly, political power. 4
Importantly, this is accomplished not by redistributionist policies, but
by ensuring equality of opportunity and the widespread ownership of
productive assets and human capital at the outset.49 Rawls is not anti-
capital or anti-corporation, but what he is suggesting is that the primary
focus should be democracy.45 0 Private property and capital must ultimately,
if indirectly, serve democratic ends, not the other way around.
kinds of social systems, with varying "political, economic, and social institutions: (a) laissez-
faire capitalism; (b) welfare-state capitalism; (c) state socialism with a command economy;
(d) property-owning democracy; and finally, (e) liberal (democratic) socialism." Id. at 136.
He then examines each regime under his two principles of justice. In his analysis, he draws
particular attention to differences between welfare-state capitalism and property-owning de-
mocracy. Id. at 139.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 The welfare provisions Rawls imagines may be quite generous, however. See id.
("The lease advantages are not.., the unfortunate and unlucky - objects of our charity and
compassion, much less our pity - put those to whom reciprocity is owed as a matter of political
just among those who are free and equal citizens along with everyone else.").
446 Id. at 139.
447 Id. at 137-38.
448 Id. at 139.
449 Id.
450 Rawls goes onto say that the aim of a property-owning democracy "is to realize in the
basic institutions the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded
as free and equal." Id. at 14o. The background institutions sketched are required for that
semblance of equality. Note the ways in which this understanding of equality meshes with
the conception of equality in the Reconstruction period, regarding the ability to participate
in economic matters as full and equal citizens. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text
(discussing the Reconstruction Amendments).
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The manager of the Berle and Means Corporation may have envisioned
his role, and the responsibility of his corporation, as serving the public good,
not just serving consumers. 451' The corporation was not simply a producer,
but a major player in the broader societal landscape. On account of this fact,
the corporation became a means, during the Nixon years, for realizing public
policy goals. 452 The merger movement of the 1970s and 80s, and the wave
of hostile takeovers, led to a shift in focus: an eventual triumph of the view
that corporations merely existed to maximize shareholder value coupled
with a rejection of any broader social aims. 453 Milton Freidman famously
wrote an essay in the New York Times entitled The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits.4 4 Many believe that this has now come to
pass. 455 In place of the institutions that originally required a public purpose,
and were literally creations of the state, the immortal corporation now truly
serves its own interests. 416 It is our contention that the singular exercise of
its power on behalf of itself is inimical to the broadest public good, and that
the conflation of the public and private spheres obscures these harms.
457
Neither Adam Smith nor the founders of the nation subscribed to
a faith in the intrinsic beneficence of corporate interests for the nation.
Quite the contrary, they feared the concentration of economic power just
as they feared the concentration of political power. These concerns became
increasingly dire with the tremendous growth of industrial production. The
Free Soil Party, which was subsequently incorporated into the nascent
Republican Party, believed that wage labor was tantamount to white or
"wage slavery" - a threat to economic independence.45
Towards the end of the Civil War, President Lincoln expressed concerns
that would have resonated with the founding generation. In a letter to a
wealthy businessman, Lincoln said:
451 Davis, supra note 42o, at I 125 (noting that economist Carl Kaysen claimed that "the
professional managers who ran America's major corporations ... took seriously the corpora-
tion's responsibility to the paramount interests of the community").
452 Id. at 1126.
453 Id. at II27-29.
454 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N-Y
TIMES MAG., Nov. 13, 197 o, at 32.
455 JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER
111-12 (2004).
456 The Michigan Supreme Court has, in fact, held that a business corporation is orga-
nized primarily for the profit of the stockholders, as opposed to the community or its employ-
ees. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 17o NW. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). However, this case is arguably
not relevant law today. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We ShouldStop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L.
& Bus. REV. 163, 166-68 (zoo8).
457 In contrast, Joel Bakan argues that corporations are pathological. BAKAN, supra note
455, at 1-2. This is only true to the extent that a corporation is a person. Our argument contests
the privileges of corporate power upon which that behavior may be based.
458 See FONER, supra note 22, at 58-59; supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing
the Republican Party's suspicion of corporations and the slavery of the white worker).
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As a result of the war corporations have been enthroned... an era of
corruption in high places will follow and the money power of the country
will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the
people until the wealth is aggregated in the hands of a few, and the
Republic is destroyed.
45 9
The extended metaphor of monarchy, employing terms such as
"enthroned" and "reign," evokes the classical liberal fear of concentrated
political or economic power, and suggests that tyranny destructive to the
republic may arise from the concentration of economic power, not just
political power.460
In the modern era, concentrated economic power has never enjoyed
stronger voice in the market place of ideas or the political arena. The
increasingly sacrosanct free speech rights of corporations, overlaying
judicial hostility to campaign financial restrictions and the deregulation and
increasing concentration of corporate media ownership, draws tighter the
dangerously close connection between economic and political power."'
Corporations have amassed never-intended rights, powers, and
authority. Consequently, they are able to accumulate enormous capital and
centralize power. The top 1% of income earners currently generate 20% of
the nation's income-"near what it was in the Gilded Age and up from about
8% in the 1970s." 46 The consumer value they produce and innovation they
promote cannot be overstated, but the consequences for democracy are just
as important. The centralization and concentration of wealth, concomitant
with widening economic inequality, impact democracy in two ways. The
centralization of economic power leads to intergenerational wealth and
privilege and the inequality of opportunity. More critically for our purposes,
centralized economic power leads to centralized political power, directly
and indirectly. Corporations can influence our political system, and thwart
attempts to regulate them. Centralized economic power, via corporate
form, allows corporations to finance candidates through direct expenditures
and campaign contributions that are sympathetic to their interests, giving
them an outsized influence relative to the average citizen. They distort our
democracy and generate inequality, since their main concern is profit, not
459 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE LINCOLN ENCYCLOPEDIA 40 (Archer H. Shaw ed., 1950). It
is worth pointing out that Lincoln's concerns are voiced despite his service as an attorney for
the Illinois Central Railroad, one of the nation's largest corporations at the time. FONER, supra
note 22, at 67.
46o See supra notes 442-5o and accompanying text.
461 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 11o Stat. 56, was a "wa-
tershed" moment, deregulating and relaxing restrictions on ownership. The legislation, touted
as a step that would foster competition, actually resulted in the subsequent mergers of several
large companies, a trend which still continues today. Sean Condon, Fightingfor Air: An Inter-
view with Eric Klinenberg, ADBUSTERS (June 27, 2007), http://www.adbusters.org/magazine/72/
FightingFor AirAninterview_with_EricKlinenberg.html.




The classical liberal fear of the danger of concentrated economic power
to individual freedom and the liberty of the individual seems to have been
realized just as public attention to this concern has largely disappeared.463
Although the anti-statism fear of concentrated political power is as salient
as ever, it has the ironic consequence of securing those undesirable
excessive corporate prerogatives that threaten democratic aims. Anti-
statism generates antipathy towards governmental regulations which might
prevent or curb corporate excesses.
The expansion of excessive corporate prerogative rests not simply on
the authority of corporations to assert their interests with monied speech,
but also to manipulate democracy more generally. Corporations may deploy
their considerable resources to reverse democratic processes or to even
manipulate democratic processes to "rig" the game. In Ohio, corporations
have sought and achieved legislative victories that preempt local
communities from passing ordinances outlawing risky horizontal hydraulic
drilling for natural gas (known as "fracking"). 46 Ohio fast food corporations
have also influenced zoning, designed to improve food quality, in order
to protect their interests.46 Such attempts to rig the rules of the game in
the race context have been, in at least several instances, overturned by
the Supreme Court, as impermissible "political restructuring."466 It seems
463 Although the Occupy Wall Street movement has emerged at the time of this writing
as one group that seems to be expressing these concerns.
464 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 27, 2004, 2004 Ohio Laws HB 278 § 1509.02 (codified as amended
at OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2007 & Supp. 20 11)); see also Greg Coleridge, Frack-
ing Democracy, OPEDNEws.CoM (Mar. 7, 2011, 3:54 PM), http://www.opednews.com/articles/
Fracking-Democracy-by-Greg-Coleridge- I 10307-981.htm.
465 See Colin McEwen, Planning Commission Reviews City's Drive-Thru Study, LAKEWOOD-
PATCH (Aug. 5, 2011), http://lakewood-oh.patch.com/articles/planning-commission-reviews-
citys-drive-thru-study.
466 In Hunter v. Erickson, Washington v. Seattle School District No. i, and Romer v. Evans,
sometimes collectively referred to as the "political restructuring" cases, the Court defended
minorities from discrimination where majorities attempt to change the rules of the game by
restructuring the political playing field. In Hunter, the Supreme Court struck down an amend-
ment to the Akron City Charter requiring any city ordinance regulating housing discrimina-
tion to be approved by a majority of the city's voters. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393
(1969). This amendment placed majority and minority groups on unequal footing. Id. at 391.
The minority, the group likely to need the protections, must overcome a unique procedural
hurdle to obtain relief. See id. at 387. On the other hand, the majority had no need for protec-
tion against housing discrimination and therefore faced no such obstacle when approaching
the city council for relief. Id. at 391. Because the amendment prevented minority groups
from approaching the city council on the same terms as everyone else, the court characterized
the charter amendment as a "special burden on racial minorities within the governmental
process" and therefore a violation of equal protection. Id. In Washington, the Supreme Court
struck down a statewide initiative designed to prohibit school boards from busing students as
a desegregation remedy. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485-87 (1982).
Prior to the initiative, minority groups could persuade school boards to adopt a busing plan;
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unlikely that similar challenges to corporate sponsored legislation would
succeed. Perhaps the boldest example of such efforts so far is Amazon.
corn's sponsored ballot initiative asking California voters to overturn
a law that would tax its online sales.467 Major corporations can "launch
expensive lobbying campaigns against even the mildest laws reining in
their behavior." '
In global labor and capital markets, corporations, in pursuit of ever
greater profits, threaten both local government and government agencies
with divestment or investment elsewhere unless they receive tax
concessions, incentives, subsidized utilities, regulatory exemptions, and
other benefits 69 Corporations force local governments and even state
governments to compete among one another in bidding wars to receive
maximum tax incentives. 40 Unless local politicians bend to their demands,
they can threaten to close a factory and move jobs to another state. 47 1 In
addition, corporations drive a race to the bottom - internationally - forcing
nation-states to offer favorable corporate tax rates or threaten to avoid
subsequent to the initiative, minority groups were unable to lobby for a busing remedy with-
out repealing the statewide initiative. Id. at 461-64. The court found significant the fact that
the school boards in Seattle were the natural decisionmaker with respect to most other ar-
eas of educational policy. Id. at 474. "The initiative removes the authority to address a racial
problem ... from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority
interests." Id. Therefore, the court extended application of Hunter to situations where the
political restructuring resulted in a horizontal shift in decision-making from the local level
to the state level. The majority was restructuring the political playing field to burden minor-
ity interests. Id. at 470-75. In Romer, the Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the
Colorado constitution repealing laws that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 62o, 635-36 (1996). Consistent with the Seattle decision, the court
found that the reallocation of political power in Romer was an impermissible horizontal shift
from the natural decision maker, the municipalities and cities, to the state. See id. at 626-3 1. In
its broadest articulation of the political restructuring principle yet, the court held that "[a] law
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others
to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most
literal sense." Id. at 633.
467 Jim Christie & Bernard Orr, Amazon Seeks Ballot Measure to Undo California Tax,
TYOMSON REUTERS (July iI, 2011, 9:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/
economy-california-amazon-idUSNt E76AiXH2o 10712.
468 TAiBBI, supra note 318, at 30.
469 BARLOW, supra note 42 1, at 63-64.
470 For an extensive discussion of this, see Karmatz, supra note 44o.
471 Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Corporate Shakedown in Toledo, COMMON-
DREAMS.ORG (Feb. 8, 2000) http://www.commondreams.org/views/oz1000-1o5.htm ("Faced
with the threat of the existing Jeep plant closing, Toledo put together a $z81 million local,
state and federal subsidy package to support company plant expansion plans. The package
includes a property tax exemption for io years, transfer of free land, including site prepara-
tion, transfer of environmental liability from DaimlerChrysler to the city and assorted other
corporate welfare handouts."). See also Greg LeroyThe Great American Jobs Scam: Corporate
Tax Dodgin and the Myth of Job Creation(2005).
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repatriating tax revenues that may be subject to local tax authority.47
Historically, the Court structured this pattern by fashioning rules that
predictably led in that direction by erecting a system of federal protection
against states, Congress, and workers.473 This asymmetry is playing out on
the international stage today, as the World Trade Organization protects
corporate prerogatives from nation-states without providing equivalent
protections for the nations' populations and the nations themselves.
474
Appropriately, it is Carolene Products that highlights the need to protect
democratic processes from corporate manipulation. Footnote four instructs
thatattempts to rig the game are subject to more searchingjudicial scrutiny.47
It is on this basis, combined with the particular attention to discrete and
insular minorities, and their unique vulnerability to majoritarian processes,
that the political restructuring doctrine has been developed. 476
By weakening governmental structures through devolution, federalism,
and deregulation, or simply by erecting constitutional protections for
corporate individuals, the threat of popular involvement in policy-
making is reduced. 477 In the late nineteenth century, corporations escaped
and attacked state regulations, taxation, and other forms of control by
using federal law as a shield or by preempting state laws with weaker or
nonexistent federal ones. Following the Environmental Protection Act
(EPA), Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and other stronger
federal forms of regulation, corporations now use the states to escape federal
regulations, since states have weaker regulations and controls. 478 This also
472 See A Look at the World's New Corporate Tax Haven, 6o MINUTES (Mar. 25, 2011, 10:31
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/zo1/03/27/6ominutes/mainZoo46867.shtml; James
Roberts, "6o Minutes" Investigates Why 1oo,ooo American Jobs Went to Ireland, IRISH CENTRAL
(Mar. 29, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://www.irishcentral.comlnewsl6o-Minutes-investigates-why-
Iooooo-American-jobs-went-to--Ireland-VIDEO- I I883o494.html; see also FONER, supra
note 22, at 316.
473 See supra Part I.
474 See, e.g., Sheldon Leader, The Collateral Protection of Rights in a Global Economy, 53
N.Y.L. SCH. L. RE v. 805, 8o8-io (zoo8).
475 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
476 See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
477 CHOMSK, supra note 156, at 345.
478 See, e.g., Christopher B. Power, West Virginia Legislature Voices Opposition to EPA Intru-
sion into State Water Quality Rulemaking, NAT. L. REv. (2oi I), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/west-virginia-legislature-voices-opposition-to-epa-intrusion-state-water-quality-
rulemaking. There is a parallel here, of course, to the race context. Before the Civil War, fed-
eral law was used by Southern slaveholders to protect the institution of slavery and to ensure
the return of fugitive slaves. Following Reconstruction, "states rights" and "local control"
were deployed and used to protect the South's racial arrangements, knowing that state laws
would be more accommodating. As with corporate law, the situation is reversing itself in some
measure. The federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, now employ federal laws to protect
both our racial arrangements and corporate prerogatives. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 551 U.S. 701, 723-25 (2007) and the upcoming review of Western
Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Montana, which the Supreme Court has stayed pending review.
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drives the race to the bottom. California and other states passed laws
implementing more stringent emissions standards, particularly regarding
carbon dioxide, than the federal EPA.479 These laws were challenged
on preemption grounds, arguing that federal law preempted states from
enacting more stringent rules.48 ° The Supreme Court recently ruled that
states could not enact more stringent rules than the EPA.481 Federal law is
now being used to overturn more aggressive state laws. Importantly, many
of the challenges to these laws are funded by corporate billionaires.482
For all of their power and individual rights, including rights and
privileges actual human beings do not enjoy, corporations cannot vote.
Corporations must persuade voters to overturn laws and regulations that
impinge on their profits. A basic strategy for making this case is to argue
that these laws and regulations harm them as well, that they are a product
of an overbearing, interventionist state.48 3 This is accomplished through
the guise of public/private. In each case, it is implied, the government is
infringing the liberties and rights of private citizens. The other strategy
is to scapegoat minorities or other marginalized groups. After creating a
major financial crisis by securitizing and selling bundled mortgages, the
major banks blamed the Community Reinvestment Act and the policy of
the United States to expand homeownership. 48
4
Historically, popular democracy and organized labor have checked
excessive corporate prerogatives. 85 However, these efforts were ultimately
blunted by the strategies just described. Initially an agrarian uprising, the
Populist movement is an example of both the impulse for democratic
accountability and the ways in which such movements may be undermined.
American farmers, still a majority of the population in the 1870s, protested
an unregulated monetary system that produced devastating depressions
Am. Tradition P'ship Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 1307 (2012). In that case, the Montana Supreme
Court upheld corporate political contribution limits under a 1912 state statute. W. Tradition
P'ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of State, 363 Mont. 220 (Mont. 201i1).
479 Peter Lattman, The Preemption Battle Royale: California v. The EPA, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3,
2oo8, 9:07 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2oo8/ol/o3/a-preemption-battle-royale--california-
v-the-epa./.
480 See Barry Bagnato, Supreme Court Backs EPA over State Govts on Climate Change, CBS
NEWS (June 20, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_I62-20072702-
503544.html.
481 Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537-38 (2011).
482 See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE CURTAIN: How KOCH
BROTHERS' MONEY INDIRECTLY SUPPORTS POLLUTERS IN AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER V. CONNECTI-
CUT 3 (201), http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-issues/the--corporate-court/billionaires_
behindthescurtain.pdf.
483 TAiEBI, supra note 318, at 29.
484 Id. at 242-45.
485 Today, of course, the Tea Party espouses populist positions that fertilize and expand
corporate prerogatives. See supra notes 1 19-121 and accompanying text.
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and financial panics. 46 Financial speculation that "regularly set off Wall
Street 'panics' produced economic depressions that dropped crop prices
and left many families deeper in debt with every cycle.4 7 The result was
a system in which financiers enjoyed a "near monopoly on capital. 48
The courts provided no recourse, as they were increasingly protective of
corporate power. Elected officials were just as unresponsive. 48 9 A small
group of farmers in Texas organized what would become the Southern
Alliance, and, by 1890, the National Farmers alliance boasted of 500,000
members in the South.49' This was the basis for the People's Party, and
the political wing of the Populist movement, which spread throughout
the Midwest, West, and Northwest.491 The early Populist effort was an
attempt to build a national coalition among freed slaves, poor whites, and
small, independent farmers. 49 They recognized the importance of making
common cause across racial lines - that to take power they would have to
make alliances with black farmers. 493 By the mid-1890s, the Populists were
drawing between twenty-five to forty-five percent of the vote in twenty
states.
494
Southern planters feared this alliance, and through a combination of
violence, race-baiting, and electoral fraud, crippled the southern populist
movement.495 Critical electoral victories in the South were denied to
Populist candidates through ballot stuffing and voter intimidation.496 The
violence aimed at the Populists in the South was even more brutal than the
state apparatus directed at the labor movements of the North, evidencing
an "extreme disregard for human life. ' 497 Through it all, appeals to white
racism and attacks on inter-racial politics were a ground for southern
terror. The crushing of the Populist movement not only precipitated the
establishment of Jim Crow (which had been successfully warded off in the
more immediate Reconstruction period), it also foreclosed the emergence
486 Kevin Baker, The Vanishing Liberal: How the Left Learned to be Helpless, HARPER'S MAG.,
April 201o, at 3I.
487 Id.
488 Id.
489 Id. at 31-32.
490 Id. at 3z.
491 MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE COLOR OF POLITICS: RACE AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERI-
CAN POLITICS 141 (1997)
492 Seeid. at 139-41.
493 Id. at 141 (I997) ("[Wlhite leaders ... realized early that they could not succeed,
especially in the South, without their African American brethren. Thus, questions of race were
to become integral to the development of this country's most militant agrarian revolt." (cita-
tion omitted)).
494 Baker, supra note 485, at 32.





of a national labor movement, a fact that would hamper union organizing
for the next century.
The United States is unique among western democracies in lacking of a
truly national labor movement.49 Southern control of black labor inhibited
the cross-racial solidarity needed to generate a strong labor movement in
the region.499 The failure to make common cause across racial lines meant
that neither civil rights for freedmen nor a strong labor movement would
come to fruition. Freedmen were used as scab labor to break unions, just
as the white union organizers helped police Jim Crow. Furthermore, one-
party dominance in the south for half a century insured Southern control
of critical political institutions that would prevent the establishment of
labor rules undermining the region's racial strictures.5, Consequently,
the United States has not had a labor party or a political party since the
Populists in which the labor movement was a central driver. l0 ' Without the
benefit of a national labor movement or labor party, critical institutional
features that developed in other western democracies, the United States
has had relatively fewer checks on the potential for excessive corporate
prerogatives. 02
When the postwar economic expansion drew to a close in the early
1970s, the "social compact" of industrial unionism began to dissolve. 03
Corporations demanded contract concessions and began the process of
moving manufacturing jobs to low-wage states and overseas.5 4 This pushed
the labor movement into a defensive position from which it has never
recovered in the United States. At the same time, the attack on unions is an
expansion of excessive corporate prerogative over individual workers. The
Taft-Hartley Act50 made it more difficult for unions to organize, and the
legislation upon which it was based exempted prevalent forms of southern
labor, especially agricultural activity.0 6 Today, right-to-work laws and
other anti-union tactics prevent the development of checks on corporate
prerogatives.
During the height of the Lochner era, John D. Rockefeller, Sr., the richest
man in the world and the capitalist par excellence, came to recognize the
498 See john a. powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW &
INEQ. 355, 380 (2007).
499 Id.
500 Id.
501 SeeALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE US AND Eu-
ROPE: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 122-26 (2004). This is in contrast to European nations, which
have major labor parties. See powell, supra note 497, at 380-82.
502 Id. at 129.
503 See FONER, supra note 22, at 316.
504 Id. at 316.
505 Labor-Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 8O-lOI, 61 Stat. 136(1947).
506 FONER, supra note 22, at 257.
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harm that unregulated capitalism could generate. Rockefeller was the
architect of the Standard Oil trust, and personally hostile to any form of
governmental intervention. 07 In fact, Rockefeller pioneered virtually every
major anticompetitive tactic to restrain trade and suppress competition.508
He came to understand that a private sector without an umpire, especially
one dominated by monopolies and oligopolies, had problematic features.
His business acumen and devilish tactics taught the American public
that "unfettered [free] markets tended . . . towards monopoly or, at least,
toward unhealthy levels of concentration, and government sometimes
needed to intervene to ensure the full benefits of competition." 5 9
Following a major financial panic in 1894, Rockefeller "awakened to the
public responsibilities attending great wealth."510 He cooperated with
the federal government to help calm the financial markets, including
providing liquidity.5.1 This response indicates that Rockefeller came to
understand that unbridled corporate power was not good for democracy or
even the economy, especially given the boom and bust cycles endemic in
unregulated markets. In the midst of the Depression, John D. Rockefeller,
Jr. even issued an appeal for Franklin D. Roosevelt's National Industrial
Recovery Act. 512 In an environment where the government was too weak,
he took this role on himself 13 It is unfortunate that this is a lesson we must
relearn. The repeal of Glass-Steagall Act,5 14 according to some, directly
precipitated the financial services mergers that brought upon us the 2008
financial meltdown.5 15 Enacted during the Depression, the Glass-Steagall
Act was designed to prevent the conglomeration of a business that was "too
big to fail."5 16
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who finally cracked the stranglehold
corporations exerted on American political and economic life, 17 also
507 CHERNOW, supra note 32, at 338.
508 Id. at 297.
509 Id.
510 Id. at 338.
511 Id.
512 Id. at 667.
513 See id. at 338, 667.
514 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. lO6-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (999)
(repealing the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 20, 32,48 Stat. 162, 188, 194).
515 Cyrus Sanati, so Years Later, Looking at Repeal of Glass-Steagall, N.Y. TiMES (Nov. z,
2009, 2:24 PM), http://dealbook.njtimes.com/2oo/9I1/z/1o-years-later-looking-at-repeal-
of-glass-steagall/.
516 See Sam Stein, Glass-Steagall Act: The Senators and Economists Who Got It Right,
HUFFINGTON POST (June II, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2oo9/o5/1I/
glass-steagall-act-the-sen_201557.html; see also Glass-Steagall Act (1933), N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
12, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/g/glass-steagall-
act_1 933/index.html?offset=o&s=newest.
517 See FONER, supra note 22, at 200-01.
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appealed to corporations to change."' 8 He asserted that without change
capitalism was in serious danger.s 19 There were strong popular hostility
to the misalignment of corporations.2 0 Dating back to the Populist52 and
Progressive5"' movements and into the 1930s,s2 3 Americans were deeply
concerned and vocal about corporations destroying the economy and
distorting our democracy. These concerns were not quelled by a facile claim
that corporations are private. There was an understanding that expansion
of corporate prerogative was a direct threat to livelihood and public voice.
524
This climate lent credibility to Roosevelt's assertion that some changes in
regulating corporations were necessary to save capitalism.525 There was also
a strong belief that there needed to be a strong middle class to buy the
products that were produced by corporations.52 6 In today's environment the
threat of corporate misalignment may be just as great. What we lack is a
popular sense of urgency and concern that was present during the Gilded
Age and ProgressiveLochner era.
527
Some will argue that on the issue of civil rights and racial equality the
modern corporation has been a force for good. This is questionable, but the
record is probably mixed. Our point is not that corporations will always use
their excessive prerogative for harmful ends, but that excessive prerogative
itself is a structural distortion. It is not surprising that Paul made his attack
on the Civil Rights Act because civil rights, claims of workers, women's
rights, and environmental concerns all limit corporate prerogative. As Rawls
and Franklin D. Roosevelt suggest, a healthy democracy and a fair economy
require this limitation. We cannot achieve racial justice, economic justice,
protect our environment, or enjoy a strong democracy unless we have a
realignment of corporations. The structure of corporate prerogative has
been undergoing realignment, but one in which their power is becoming
ever greater. It is an alignment in the wrong direction.
518 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Presidential Campaign Address on Progressive Gov-
ernment at the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, California (Sept. 23, 1932), in I THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE GENESIS OF THE NEW DEAL,
1928-1932, at 742, 754-56 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
519 Id. at 753-55.
520 See FONER, supra note 22, at 196.
521 Seeid. at 127.
522 Cf id. at 140-41.
523 See id. at 204.
524 Seeid. at 197.
525 Id. at 195-200.
526 See id. at 199.





Our political tradition embodies vigilance against the concentration and
abuse of power. The founders of the Republic conceived of the United
States in terms that resisted the exercise of centralized political power,
which they called tyranny, and fashioned a tripartite system of checks and
balances to defuse the authority of the federal government among co-
equal branches. The Reconstruction era framers, having experienced the
tyranny of state governments, built in further checks on power, to protect
discrete and insular minorities from majoritarian tyranny. The framers of
the Republic were equally wary of the concentration of economic power.
But today, we remain too silent on the abuses this form of power may
exercise.
In this article, we have suggested that a reason for this blind spot is the
public/private dichotomy, by which all relevant actors are uncomfortably
sorted into one of two categories. As an alternative set of heuristics by
which we may become attentive to these dangers and better observe them,
we offered four categories: public, private, non-public/non-private and
corporate. The exercise of excessive corporate prerogatives has depended
upon a simple conflation of these spheres.
In Part I of this article, we highlighted the bases for and described
the expansion of corporate prerogative, ushered in by elites, lawyers, and
courts, often over the opposition of democratic majorities. We explored
the development of corporate personhood doctrine from its incipient
forms in Dartmouth and Letson to its full-blown appearance in Santa Clara.
This doctrine has become the foundation for clothing corporations in
constitutional rights. The commercial speech doctrine that has evolved in
decisions like Citizens United has continued that expansion. We examined
how the State Action doctrine, Commerce Clause, and Substantive Due
Process doctrines shielded corporations from both state and federal
regulation. Although some of these doctrines may no longer exist in their
original forms, they each played a vital role in legal thought and popular
culture by conflating corporate and private actors.
Part II examined the origins of the public/private distinction, the
hydraulic relationship between both domains, and the feminist and critical
legal studies critique of this dichotomy. We noted the criticism of the
public/private dichotomy in shielding discrimination and exploitation from
government interference. We explored the relationship between public
activity and private conduct. Laws arise from culture, and vice versa. A
sharp public/private distinction not only obscures the relationship between
law and culture, it cannot account for the ways in which private behavior -
even private goods - are a product of public policy. From housing markets




More generally, the state is present in all markets. As legal scholars
have noted, market relations are conditioned by and dependent upon
the existing system of legal rules, including property, tort, and contract
law.5 8 The notion of a free market wholly unencumbered by legal or
professional regulation is a fiction, albeit a popular one. The question
is not whether to regulate, but how.52 9 The form of regulation not only
distributes wealth and resources, but also power and belonging. This is
the essence of the Civil Rights Acts, which seek to expand the circle of
human concern by incorporating all groups into the public sphere and
by prohibiting private discrimination. The public/private distinction
masks the power dynamics that differentiate corporate and private
actors, and serves to protect both corporate prerogatives and white
space from governmental interference under the guise of 'free markets.'
Although we share the criticism of feminist legal scholars and critical
legal theorists of the public/private distinction, we offer a four-sphere
paradigm as a re-articulation of the public/private distinction. From
this perspective, we are better able to observe how the corporate sphere
threatens individual freedom and personal privacy, and how marginalized
groups may experience exclusion from both public benefits and private
rights. We explained how these spaces were constructed by the Court, and
have continually been reinscribed in recent years. They also illuminate
the dangers of privatization for expanding corporate space and reducing
democratic accountability.
Part III brings into focus the need for a realignment of corporate space
in the United States. We began by investigating the role of corporations
today, and examined the justifications offered for the expansion of corporate
prerogative. The exercise of excessive corporate prerogatives poses special
dangers to our democracy. We explored the insights of John Rawls as a
roadmap for examining a potential realignment for corporate space in our
democracy.
Throughout this article we have argued that the expansion and exercise
of corporate power properly coincides with and makes concomitant
disempowerment of people of color. We observed pre-Reconstruction
528 SUNSTEIN, supra note 198.
529 Cite to HARcOURT, supra note 206. In other words, every market is bounded by some
regulatory scheme, whether it is as basic as fundamental property laws or as extensive as a
control and command economy. As Harcourt explains:
The liberalization of markets and privatization of industries during portions of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries merely substited one set of regulations, often
governmental forms of rule-making, with other regulatory systems that merely
favored a different set of actors. There is, to be sure, a sense of liberation that ac-
companies the "liberalization of markets. But it is illusory and serves as a cover that
simply renders distributional outcomes more natural. It appears to take govern-
ment out of the mix and thereby give the impression that outcomes are not based
entirely on merit or talent. All the while, the state actually facilitates and makes




moves to protect corporate standing while barring blacks from the same,
culminating in Dred Scott. We then observed how the Reconstruction
Amendments were hijacked from their asserted purpose and deployed in
a variety of ways to definitively ground corporate personhood and shield
corporate prerogatives during the period of Lochner and Jim Crow. We then
observed how the Revolution of 1937 simultaneously reversed Lochner
and began to unwind Jim Crow. Finally, we witnessed the sometimes
halting and ultimately successful effort in Bakke and Belotti to expand
corporate prerogatives while circumscribing the reach and protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment for marginalized groups culminating in Citizens
United and Parents Involved.
Members of the Court and many lay people worry that the expansion
of corporate influence may crowd out democracy, especially in the area of
political speech and electoral influence. While we share this concern, we
are suggesting that even this framing is too limited an understanding of
the stakes. What is less understood is the relationship between excessive
corporate prerogative, civil rights, privacy and democracy. The Populist
effort to challenge corporate power was organized in the context of building
a racially inclusive democracy. This effort was not abandoned so much as
it was thwarted on that front in favor of what Michael Omi and Howard
Winant called a "racial dictatorship." 30 The Populist movement foundered
on the shoals of racial prejudice. The promise of democracy cannot be
achieved unless it is broadly inclusive.
Our trend toward shrinking public space, hostile localism, and expansive
corporate rights engenders the further marginalization of historically
disadvantaged groups, expanding non-public, non-private space. While
this may be most visible in cases such as Dred Scott, it is no less evident
in cases like Parents Involved or Milliken, which sanction public and private
behavior that contributes to the segregation of our nation's geography by
race and class. The consequences, however, reach beyond those spaces,
but extend throughout the institutions they help erect and culture they
generate.
This article suggests that corporations make good servants, but bad
masters. To paraphrase Rawls, we can have either a corporatist welfare state
or democracy, property respecting state.53' The rapid expansion of corporate
prerogative and growth of corporate space is not only a threat to individual
liberty and democratic accountability, it is a threat to the broadest public
good. The concentration of wealth and influence in corporate form is an
increasingly evident structural distortion in our economy and our politics.
When the Populists abandoned the effort to build a broadly inclusive
movement that included blacks in the south, they lost both the economic
530 MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM
THE 1960S TO THE 199os 65-69 (zd ed. 1994).
531 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at 135-36.
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fight as well as the democratic possibility. In a much more diverse country,
we are again confronting this challenge. While racial attitudes have
improved remarkably since the late 1890s, there is increasing evidence of
deep racial anxiety as the United States races towards a non-white majority
within a few decades. It is no coincidence that these demographic changes
are occurring amidst growing reluctance to invest in shared public provision
and calls to privatize and divest public space. To make corporations our
servant, we need as Theodore Roosevelt argued a century ago, a strong
federal government, and perhaps an international regulatory regime as
well as strong collective action by citizens.53 To accomplish that goal, we
must clarify a misleading public/private distinction and tame the Court as
Franklin D. Roosevelt managed to do in the 1930s.
Through much of the late nineteenth century there were two overlapping
struggles to realize the promise of our democracy: the struggle to realize
civil rights, and the gilded era Populist and progressive effort to rein in
corporations, which resulted not only in the progressive amendments to the
constitution, but a bevy of state laws regulating corporate influence . 3 3 The
Lochner era Court infamously inscribed corporate prerogatives throughout
the fabric of the Reconstruction Amendments while simultaneously
denying those rights to freed slaves and their progeny. The reawakened
and invigorated ideology of market fundamentalism calls into question
the scope of governmental authority to regulate the market, not only in
an effort to check the exercise of excessive corporate prerogative, but also
ensure the guarantee of civil rights.
It is not surprising that Senator Rand Paul, in a moment of candor,
criticized the Civil Rights Act because civil rights, the rights of workers to
organize, women's rights, and environmental protections all limit corporate
prerogative. As Rawls and Franklin D. Roosevelt might suggest, a healthy
democracy and a fair economy require this limitation. The danger we all
face is not simply a weak democracy and anemic public space dominated
by corporate elites, but a distorted private space surveiled and invaded by
corporate actors. The expansion of corporate space is a threat to everyone,
and should not be confused with the liberty of the private sphere.
532 By "regulation" we mean something different than the conventional understanding
of a narrow rule which constrains a particular kind of behavior, but a more general set of mar-
ket rules which would engender a more appropriate alignment of corporations in our democ-
racy and across the globe. We are not anti-corporate or anti-market. We are not calling for the
"regulation of free markets" by rather note that all markets are regulated, and the question is
not whether regulations should exist, but how they should be structured.
533 One such law is now being challenged in the Montana Supreme Court case as dis-
cussed supra note 478.
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